• BW & CWToxic Terrorism

    By Ajey Lele

    On 26 June 2026, during the Muharram procession in Mumbai, a man was arrested for allegedly distributing poisonous capsules to participants. This suspected terror plot was an attempt to ensure mass casualties amongst using a toxic substance. It is a timely reminder that national security today extends far beyond conventional terrorism.

  • DUAL-USE RESEARCHFirst Large-Scale Empirical Analysis of Dual-Use Research and Security Oversight

    Dual-use research refers to scientific research that has both legitimate civilian applications and potential security-sensitive applications. A new analysis of approximately 600,000 research papers reveals structural limits to single-country security oversight of dual-use research and identifies trade-offs that policymakers face when strengthening such oversight.

  • AGRICULTURAL SECURITYAgricultural Security Considerations for the U.S. Corn Belt

    A new report examines the agricultural security risks to crop production in the U.S. Corn Belt, the backbone of the United States’ food, feed, and biofuel industries. The report reviews key threats and mitigation strategies for bioresiliency.

  • AIAI Can Design and Run Thousands of Lab Experiments without Human Hands. Humanity Isn’t Ready for the New Risks This Brings to Biology

    By Stephen D. Turner

    What happens when the same capabilities operate outside those controls is a question that policy has not yet answered. Overreact, and talent and investment may move elsewhere while the technology continues advancing anyway. Underreact, and the risks of that technology could be exploited to cause real harm.

  • BIOTHREATSPick Your Poison: The Enduring Threat of Biological Toxins

    By Alex Kyabarongo and Lena Kroepke

    A summary of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense’s “Pick Your Poison: The Enduring Threat of Biological Toxins” at the Atlantic Council. 

  • BIODEFENSEPhysical Approaches to Civilian Biodefense

    Progress in biological sciences and technologies will offer more opportunities to improve human well-being in the coming decades, but this progress may also lower barriers that are blocking bad actors from engineering pathogens to cause destruction. We need to identify potential preparedness measures for challenging biological threats.

  • AI-ENABLED BIOWEAPONSGlobal Risk Index for AI-enabled Biological Tools

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the life sciences, accelerating breakthroughs in research, drug discovery and biotechnology. However, some of the AI tools that drive innovation can also be misused, posing significant dual-use risks.

  • RISKY BIOLOGICAL RESEARCHDefining Risk in Biological Research: Why Researchers Need Clearer Oversight Frameworks

    By Barbara Del Castello, Adeline Williams and John Tarangelo

    Policymakers and researchers need a consistent and transparent way to weigh the risks and benefits of risky biological research to facilitate review processes and oversight.

  • BIOSECURITYCritical Action Needed to Address Growing Biosecurity Risks

    A new report warns that biosecurity risks are increasing. Emerging technologies and other trends are making biological threats more numerous, frequent, and consequential. The report outlines how emerging biotechnology must itself be used to secure biology, akin to how software is required to secure software.

  • BIOSECURITYA View from the CT Foxhole: James Stack, Director, Great Plains Diagnostic Network

    By Don Rassler and Kristina Hummel

    There are multiple definitions of biosecurity, and oftentimes it intersects with definitions of biosafety. But if we look at biosecurity in the sense of the unintentional or intentional introduction of an organism, we have a long history on the plant side in terms of protecting food systems and natural plant systems. But 9/11 did bring a focus on the intentional side.

  • AIFiltered Data Stops Openly Available AI Models from Performing Dangerous Tasks

    Researchers have reported a major advance in safeguarding open-weight language models. By filtering out potentially harmful knowledge during training, the researchers were able to build models that resist subsequent malicious updates – especially valuable in sensitive domains such as biothreat research.

  • ARGUMENT: AI-DESIGNED BIOWEAPONS LOOMAre We Ready for a ‘DeepSeek for Bioweapons’?

    Anthropic’s Claude 4 is a warning sign: AI that can help build bioweapons is coming, and could be widely available soon. Steven Adler writes that we need to be prepared for the consequences: “like a freely downloadable ‘DeepSeek for bioweapons,’ available across the internet, loadable to the computer of any amateur scientist who wishes to cause mass harm. With Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4 having finally triggered this level of safety risk, the clock is now ticking.”

  • GAIN OF FUNCTION RESEARCHTrump Administration Issues Restrictive Executive Order to Govern Gain-of-Function Research

    Last week President Trump signed an executive order which imposes new restrictions on gain-of-function (GoF) research. Scientists and biosecurity experts say it is not unreasonable to review the security measures governing GoF research, but that the administration has used a definition of GoF which is too broad, vague, and inaccurate, raising the concern that the United States will become less safe, and less prepared for unforeseen biothreats, as essential research and important studies would be hobbled because of the wide net cast by the executive order.

  • SENSORSLow-Power Sensors Could Last 10 Years, Providing Surveillance, Security

    By Mollie Rappe

    Researchers at Sandia have spent the last three years developing an ultra-low-power chemical sensor to detect sarin and other chemical warfare agents or gaseous industrial toxins, aiming to protect the public and warfighters.

  • BIOSECURITYAI Tools Can Enhance U.S. Biosecurity; Monitoring and Mitigation Will Be Needed to Protect Against Misuse

    A new report recommends ways for the U.S. to reap the benefits of artificial intelligence in biotechnology while minimizing risks that AI may be misused to develop harmful biological agents.