• BIOSECURITYAI Tools Can Enhance U.S. Biosecurity; Monitoring and Mitigation Will Be Needed to Protect Against Misuse

    A new report recommends ways for the U.S. to reap the benefits of artificial intelligence in biotechnology while minimizing risks that AI may be misused to develop harmful biological agents.

  • BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSForging the Biological Weapon Convention: A Brief History of the Creation of the BWC

    The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) stands as a monument to international ambition: the first multilateral treaty to comprehensively ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The treaty’s origins are deeply rooted in the horrors of 20th-century warfare, advancements in biotechnology, and the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War.

  • BIORISKSThe Far-Reaching Impacts of Agricultural Biorisk Research

    By Jay Bickell

    There is a deep interconnection between agricultural biorisks and human health. It is critical that this perspective is brought to the forefront of policy and research discussions so that agricultural biorisks are prioritized as a threat to national security and receive the necessary research funding: .A summary of the USDA ARS 8th International Biosafety & Biocontainment Symposium.

  • ARGUMENT: TULSI GABBRD AS DNI“Tulsi Gabbard as US Intelligence Chief Would Undermine Efforts Against the Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons”: Expert

    The Senate, along party lines, last week confirmed Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National intelligence. One expert on biological and chemical weapons says that Gabbard’s “longstanding history of parroting Russian propaganda talking points, unfounded claims about Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and conspiracy theories all in efforts to undermine the quality of the community she now leads” make her confirmation a “national security malpractice.”

  • BIOTERRORISMAI, Bioterrorism and the Urgent Need for Australian Action

    By Greg Sadler

    Experts worry that, within a few years, AI will put that capability into the hands of tens of thousands of people. Without a new approach to regulation, the risk of bioterrorism and lab leaks will soar.

  • FOOD SECURITYBiosecurity for Food Security

    By Saba Sinai and Andrew Henderson

    Biosecurity is a fundamental enabler for a country’s’ food security, a critical but often overlooked element of national security, and it is time for it to be treated accordingly.

  • BIODEFENSENational Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Comes Under Budget

    DHS has commissioned the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas under budget, and has returned $10,082,355.80 in gift funds to the state of Kansas.

  • BIOSECURITYCanada’s Biosecurity Scandal: The Risks of Foreign Interference in Life Sciences

    By Brendan Walker-Munro

    In July 2019, world-renowned biological researchers Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng were quietly walked out of the Canadian government’s National Microbiology Lab (NML). The original allegation against them was that Qiu had authorized a shipment to China of some of the deadliest viruses on the planet, including Ebola and Nipah. Then the story seemed to go away—until now.

  • BIORISKSNew International Biosecurity Organization Launched to Safeguard Bioscience

    Amid rapid advances in bioscience and biotechnology that could  pose significant global security risks without effective guardrails, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) last month launched the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), a first-of-its-kind organization to strengthen international biosecurity governance. IBBIS, an independent organization to be headquartered in Geneva, provides tools that will allow technological innovation to flourish, safely and responsibly.

  • BIORISKSDeveloping Safety Tools for Synthetic Biology to Defend Against Potential Misuse of AI

    Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to help develop biotechnologies that can improve human health or that may increase harm. Organizations performing nucleic acid synthesis must be aware of AI-related risks and need guidance in identifying and mitigating those risks.

  • BIORISKSAttributing Biological Weapons Use

    Why is attribution of BW use important? During a biological incident, including BW use, what evidence might provide valuable information to facilitate attribution? What is the state of the science for determining the origin of a biological incident, including BW use? What capabilities does DoD possess or could it develop to facilitate attribution of BW use?

  • AI & WMDDoes AI Enable and Enhance Biorisks?

    The diversity of the biorisk landscape highlights the need to clearly identify which scenarios and actors are of concern. It is important to consider AI-enhanced risk within the current biorisk landscape, in which both experts and non-experts can cause biological harm without the need for AI tools, thus highlighting the need for layered safeguards throughout the biorisk chain.

  • GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCHU.S. House Approves Federal Funding Ban on GoF Research

    The House of Representatives approved HR 5894, which includes a measure banning federal funding for studies that include gain-of-function research. Though the bill in question still requires Senate approval to have a chance to take effect, this move will likely be worrying to many in the scientific community.

  • BIODEFENSEThe Need for Speed in Biodefense: How JPEO-CBRND is Shaping its Biological Defense and Medical Strategies

    By Kelly Burkhalter and Daniel Critchfield

    Biological incidents possess an alarming ability to wreak havoc on a massive scale, capable of rapidly escalating beyond the scale seen during COVID-19. The need lies in developing solutions that surpass the speed of these threats. The future of biodefense depends on the ability to rapidly respond to an event by quickly developing and distributing medical countermeasures (MCMs), such as vaccines and therapeutics. This includes optimizing manufacturing techniques and establishing robust partnerships to ensure these MCMs can be quickly and effectively deployed in the event of a threat.

  • BIOTHREATSNatural or Not? Identifying Genetically Engineered Organisms

    By Aliyah Kovner

    Ever since gene editing became feasible, researchers and health officials have sought tools that can quickly and reliably distinguish genetically modified organisms from those that are naturally occurring. Following the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the world at large became aware of this need. Now, such tools are being built. The development of new tools to detect modified bacteria, viruses, and cells has bolstered national security against biological threats.