• GAZA WAR

    When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by force of arms in 2007, it faced an ideological crisis. It could focus on governing Gaza and addressing the needs of the Palestinian people, or it could use the Gaza Strip as a springboard from which to attack Israel. Even then, Hamas understood these two goals were mutually exclusive. And while some anticipated Hamas would moderate, or at least be co-opted by the demands of governing, it did not. Instead, Hamas invested in efforts to radicalize society and build the militant infrastructure necessary to someday launch the kind of attack that in its view could contribute to the destruction of Israel. The road from Hamas’ 2007 takeover of Gaza to the October 2023 massacre offers insights about the organization and its goals.

  • TERRORISM

    Germany’s domestic intelligence agency says the danger of a terror attack in the country is “higher than it has been for a long time.” It cited the October 7 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war as factors.

  • SHIPPING SECURITY

    Since Houthis seized a ship owned by an Israeli businessman last week in the Red Sea, global shipping has been taking stock of potentially rising risks.

  • GAZA WAR

    Israel cannot continue living with a Hamas-controlled Gaza. The untenability of having Hamas on Israel’s border has long been clear. However, to dismantle and disarm the group was always going to involve grievous civilian bloodshed and the inflaming of anti-Israeli opinion—a prohibitive proposition for Israel prior to 7 October. Yet now Israel finds itself facing this task anyway, which is a reminder to the world that tolerating the intolerable—even grudgingly, because the alternatives are too difficult—is never sustainable in the long term. This was demonstrated on 7 October.

  • GAZA WAR

    The catastrophic Hamas attack on October 7, which has led to the deaths of so many Palestinian civilians in Gaza in Israel’s response to the Hamas attack, has eliminated any pretense of legitimacy that Hamas may ever have had in the eyes of most of the world. Indeed, the days of Hamas may be over. But this will only increase the urgency of finding a long-term solution for Palestine, something that seems further away than ever.

  • TERRORISM

    African terrorist groups are using global affiliations to acquire and modify drones for their own needs. Though the drones are not yet being used to launch attacks, the growing use of drones by terrorist groups is only a question of time, and analysts worry that in the long run, they could change the balance of power with governments.

  • GAZA WAR

    Using places and things civilians need, like hospitals, as a means to fight a war is considered a weapon of the weak. It is a way to use another side’s values against it. I think it is clear that Hamas has – in this war and historically – tried to embed themselves and weapons in places civilians live or visit, in order to make it more difficult for the Israelis to target them. But using civilians to further a military advantage is not a new phenomenon.

  • AUTHORITARIANISM

    People with authoritarian political views are more likely to be concerned about terrorism and border control than a future new health pandemic, new research shows.

  • GAZA WAR

    Hamas, the terrorist organization, which has provided misleading or false information to reporters, distorts information about the casualties in Gaza. Hamas controls the Gaza Health Ministry, which is the predominant source of information on casualties in Gaza. While some media outlets have recently begun to identify the Gaza Health Ministry as a Hamas-controlled entity, many do not, which constitutes an omission of a source’s clear bias.

  • EXTREMISM

    In the month following Hamas’s terror attack on Israel, antisemitic incidents in the U.S. increased by 316 percent compared to the same time period last year. At the same time, Americans are growing increasingly concerned about antisemitism, with more than 70 percent agreeing in a new survey that Jew-hatred is a serious problem.

  • TERRORISM

    Despite intense efforts to counter violent extremism over the past two decades, the threat of domestic terrorism still endangers Australians. The focus has shifted from primarily transnational jihadists to violent homegrown ideologues with a range of motivations. As violent extremism evolves, Australia must adapt its strategy to confront this persistent challenge and protect social cohesion and national security.

  • GAZA WAR

    Promoters of conspiracy theories and hate are using generative artificial intelligence (GAI) to create misleading content about the Israel-Hamas war. This not only amplifies confusion and hate on social media; it can also cause some to doubt the validity of actual war images, creating unnecessary suspicion at a time of deeply polarized public opinion.

  • GAZA WAR

    Real or fake? Images generated by artificial intelligence have become a disinformation tool in the war between Israel and Hamas. DW’s fact-checking team shows you how to spot them.

  • ARGUMENT: QANON & ARMED MILITIAS

    Beginning 3-4 years ago, the Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters — the three extremist anti-government militia groups playing a prominent role in the 6 January attack on the Capitol — have adjusted their ideological perspective to find a rallying point around QAnon conspiracy theories. “Throughout 2020, as members of extremist groups coalesced in what researchers have termed a ‘militia-sphere,’ their messaging latched on to QAnon conspiracy theories.”

  • GAZA WAR

    Hamas invites civilian casualties by its positioning of military assets, and now that it knows that Israel’s risk tolerance is well beyond anything it has seen before, it likely sees outcries over more civilian casualties leading to a ceasefire as its only chance of survival. And Washington hopes that Israel can inflict grievous damage on Hamas before the White House will have to acquiesce to public opinion and back some kind of ceasefire. Israel, Hamas and Washington are all accepting of civilian casualties in Gaza—they only differ in how many and why.

  • GAZA WAR

    Individuals and networks providing various forms of support for Hamas have been active in America for decades. Internal Hamas documents and FBI wiretaps show the existence of a nationwide Hamas network engaged in fundraising, lobbying, education, and propaganda dissemination dating back to the 1980s.

  • GAZA WAR

    In the wake of the Israel-Hamas war, a wave of antisemitism and Islamophobia has swept across the United States, putting American Jewish and Muslim communities on edge. There has been a staggering 312 cases of antisemitic harassment, vandalism and assault during the first two weeks of the war, a nearly five-fold increase from the same period last year.

  • ARGUMENT: FAILURE OF IMAGINATION

    The surprise, brutal 7 October attack by Hamas has sent shockwaves around the world. Israel’s surprise was deeper than a combined intelligence and operational surprise. Leo Blanken, Ian Rice, and Craig Whiteside write that “It was failure of imagination.” What Israel missed “is the growing democratization of technology, which is rapidly providing new and dangerous capabilities to non-state actors.”

  • GAZA WAR

    Israel’s military commanders will know that this is unlikely to be a simple operation. Among the factors complicating their mission of eliminating Hamas is the “Gaza Metro”, a vast network of interconnected tunnels within the region. Having invested heavily in subterranean infrastructure over the years, Hamas is counting on this network to aid its survival in the coming weeks. These tunnels are defended, booby-trapped and likely to be populated with human shields and hostages as well as fighters, they will be challenging for even a well-equipped and capable attacking force.

  • GAZA WAR

    The logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to deterring organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. It is this different type of deterrence that failed on 7 October 2023 and which may now never be restored. Israel now has been forced to look beyond deterrence. It has now concluded that it is dealing with an entity that has never truly been deterred and can’t be deterred in the future. This is where the other flaw in Israel’s past deterrence strategy becomes painfully evident. It has not been accompanied by a more positive political strategy.