• QUICK TAKES // By Ben FrankelTargeting Nuclear Scientists

    The killing of Iranian nuclear scientists has been an integral part of Israel’s campaign, stretching back more than two decades, to disrupt and derail Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The 14 Iranian scientists killed on and since 13 June were all leading members of the Iran’s nuclear weaponization group.

  • CLOAK & DAGGERNuclear Scientists  Have Long Been Targets in Covert Ops – Israel Has Brought That Policy Out of the Shadows

    By Jenna Jordan and Rachel Whitlark

    Since 1944, there have been at least 100 instances of what researchers call nuclear “scientist targeting.” The most recent example are the 14 senior Iranian nuclear scientists Israel killed on 13 June as part of the opening move of its surprise attack on Iran, in which Israel has also decapitated the Iranian military, intelligence services, and Revolutionary Guard by killing practically all of these organizations’ leaders and senior officers – several dozen in all. In the week since the attack was launched, Israel has killed three more Iranian nuclear scientists.

  • ISRAEL-IRAN WARHow Might Israel Attack Iran’s Underground Nuclear Plant? A 2024 Raid in Syria Could e a Template

    By Clive Jones

    One of the key elements of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program is the uranium enrichment plant at Fordow, where about 5,000 centrifuges operate in an underground centrifuge farm 80 meters below ground. Israel may find it difficult to destroy the facility in an aerial attack — it does not have the U.S.-made 30,000lb GBU-57 MOP (massive ordnance penetrator) or the planes to carry this munition. But it may decide to destroy Fordow in a daring ground attack, similar to the one it conducted in Syria on 8 September 2024, in which Israeli commandoes destroyed an underground Syrian missile production facility.

  • IRAN’S NUKESAnalysis of the IAEA’s Comprehensive Iran NPT Safeguards Report May 2025

    By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker

    The Trump administration’s 2018 decision to unilaterally withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran was a gift to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, freeing Iran from that deal’s tight restrictions on developing nuclear weapons – a freedom which Iran has used to accelerate, unhindered, its rush toward the bomb. But Iran is still a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bars member states from developing nuclear weapons. The recent IAEA report notes that Iran is in egregious violation of its NPT obligations, and that it has been engaging in an elaborate, ongoing cover-up of its nuclear weapons-related activities.   

  • IRAN’S NUKESIranian Breakout Timelines Under JCPOA-Type Limits

    By David Albright

    The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) made it impossible for Iran, if it withdrew from the deal, to produce enough weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for a nuclear weapon in less than 12 months. The U.S unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018 has changed the situation so fundamentally in favor of Iran and its nuclear weapons program, that new limits are needed, the most important of which is that Iran destroy centrifuges and related equipment, rather than store them. A focus on only limiting enriched uranium stocks will not provide sufficient breakout timelines.

  • IRAN’S NUKESOperation Opera Redux? Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Preventive War Paradox

    By Patrick Sullivan

    The 1981 Israeli destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor was an operational success, but is regarded by many as a strategic failure. Scholars call this the preventive war paradox: compromising one’s security in the long term through military action that is operationally successful.

  • NUCLEAR SURVIVALWhat We’ve Learned from Survivors of the Atomic Bombs

    By Nancy Huddleston

    Q&A with Dr. Preetha Rajaraman, New Vice Chair for the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.

  • IRAN’S NUKESShowdown in the Middle East

    By Lawrence Freedman

    In 2018, President Trump abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, claiming that Obama’s deal wasn’t good enough and that he would get a better one by imposing “maximum pressure.” As was predicted in 2018, the Iranian response to the U.S. campaign of maximum pressure was not to offer the Americans more, but instead to press ahead with enriching Uranium to the point where they are now close to having enough to build some nuclear weapons should they choose to do so. Can a new round of negotiations, or military action, stop Iran getting a nuclear weapon?

  • IRAN’S NUKESWhere the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks Are Headed

    By Ray Takeyh

    The Iranian position remains that the talks should focus on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, with Iran repeatedly stating that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes. Trump has said that he only wants assurances that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. Thus, issues such as Iran’s support for regional proxies and its missile program could be off the table.

  • NUCLEAR WASTEHow and Where Is Nuclear waste stored in the U.S.?

    By Gerald Frankel

    Around the U.S., about 90,000 tons of nuclear waste is stored at over 100 sites in 39 states, in a range of different structures and containers. For decades, the nation has been trying to send it all to one secure location. Perhaps there will be a temporary site whose location passes muster with the Supreme Court. But in the meantime, the waste will stay where it is.

  • THE RUSSIA CONNECTIONCan Europe Defend Itself Against a Nuclear-Armed Russia?

    By Christina Pazzanese

    National security expert details what’s being done, what can be done as U.S. appears to rethink decades-long support. Regarding the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which has covered Europe since the 1950s, Richard Hooker says: “Is it reliable? I wouldn’t think so. If Putin were to threaten or actually use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or, let’s say in Estonia, would the administration respond with nuclear threats of its own? Personally, I have my doubts.”

  • IRAN’S NUKESNegotiating a New Iran Nuclear Deal

    By The Institute for Science and International Security

    In August 2019, the Institute for Science and International Security produced astudy at the request of the administration for an internal discussion. It is not the current administration’s or the Institute’s position, although the Institute supports the general thrust, especially the need to go beyond JCPOA limits and for Iran to provide the IAEA a verified complete nuclear declaration.

  • POST-U.S. NATOFrench Nuclear Deterrence for Europe: How Effective Could It Be Against Russia?

    By Benoît Grémare

    Does France have the capacity to defend Europe? Would the deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make Europe strategically autonomous, giving it the means to defend itself independently?

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSB61-12 System Production Ends, Sustainment Begins

    By Kenny Vigil

    A nuclear weapon milestone: in December, Sandia Lab has completed the last production unit of the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb.

  • IRAN’S NUKESCan Israel Destroy Iran's Nuclear Program?

    By Kian Sharifi

    U.S. intelligence has concluded that the odds of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program in the next few months are high, but the jury is out on whether Israel can destroy its archfoe’s nuclear facilities on its own.