A better path to container scanning

the legislation was drafted. At the present time U.S. ports utilize PVT portal machines that are very good at detecting radiation from materials such as ceramic tile but not highly enriched uranium or shielded uranium. Therefore, Congress is expecting that new portal machines will be developed and commercialized to detect dangerous radiation. These new machines, called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), have not been yet developed. The GAO in April 2007 stated clearly that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) established and responsible for ASP development has not even collected all the testing data on its basic PVT portal detectors and is not close to any developed ASP portal detector. Experts do not expect a commercial version of the ASP anytime soon, if ever. Congress knew the technology did not exist. We do not have the machines now, and we will likely have them in five years. Therefore, Congress allowed for an extension until such time that these radiation portal detection machines become available. Giermanski recommends that scanning for shielded radiation be done now without new portal-machine technology by using in-container technology and systems. With the use of in-container systems that can detect and report WMD, one can learn the container’s risk factor long before it gets to any seaport.

* Problem Four: Both laws have failed to designate land ports-of-entry as critical infrastructure. Neither these nor any other U.S. laws designate land ports as critical. Therefore, no funding is available under the critical infrastructure umbrella and they are not included in the concept of ports outlined in the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Congress has also failed to consider the criticality of land ports and the risks and vulnerabilities these ports host.

“Actually, the fix is simple,” writes Giermanski. “With respect to the use of ‘at’ seaports, Congress merely has to amend the Acts to allow for the alternative use of in-container systems of detection and reporting. With respect to land ports-of-entry as critical infrastructure, the fix is just as clear: Amend the Acts to include land ports! These amendments seem not only legislatively simple and doable, but also seem smart.” These amendments would be favored not only by U.S. trading partners, and worldwide Customs authorities, but also by industry itself that has more to gain than lose by adopting existing in-container systems. In addition to collected WMD intelligence, in-container systems that begin at origin and end at destination provide not only greater security with respect to unauthorized container access, but they can be used by the private sector and government alike to improve risk assessments, provide electronic evidence for transshipment verifications, better logistics control, knowledge of product locations within the global supply chain, and ultimately for industry, a verifiable financial savings brought about by CBP special treatment (Green Lanes) that accelerate container movement through traditionally cluttered seaports and land ports. “Finally, they are smart alternatives that serve the goals of Congress to help keep us safe. The current scanning requirement fails to do so,” Giermanski concludes.