DHS misses deadline for certifying new radiation detectors
for the advanced monitor program in the fiscal 2008 omnibus spending bill, requiring the homeland security secretary to guarantee that the machines would represent a “significant increase” in effectiveness. Lawmakers asked for two “separate and distinct” certifications: one showing the system improves performance over existing technology as a first line of detection, and a second describing its benefits as a backup to augment existing sensors.
Matishak notes that members of Congress have not been alone in their skepticism. The National Academy of Sciences stated in a June interim report requested by lawmakers that the government should not purchase any more of the advanced monitors because they are only marginally more effective than existing technology. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its sixth assessment of the effort that same week and found the new devices perform better than existing equipment only when the radioactive material is lightly shielded.
System testing
The portal monitor’s 2008-09 test campaign moved the program from developmental assessments of the machine’s technology to performance exercises and eventually operational tests in real-world situations, according to Kuban.
The campaign included system qualification tests to demonstrate the machines are manufactured to meet government requirements, along with demonstrations at the Nevada Test Site to assess the system’s ability to detect a material and pinpoint the source. The systems were also tested to see if they could identify various substances, including naturally occurring radioactive material, and medical and industrial isotopes in “masking configurations,” according to Kuban.
Masking scenarios use other materials and radioactive sources to conceal or change the radiation signature of the threat, she said. For security reasons, Kuban could not disclose the specific masking scenarios employed in the tests.
The test campaign also included integration activities to determine whether the portals are capable of operating in combination with the other border protection equipment, such as software and communication systems.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has completed two rounds of field validation for the system this year and is working to address issues as they are identified, according to Kuban. She did not provide specifics regarding what “operational ease and reliability” issues have been recognized.
Existing technology, however, has several drawbacks, including only being able to detect unshielded or lightly shielded radioactive sources. Alarms can also be triggered by bananas and a number of other commonplace items that contain radioactive isotopes.
Detection office and border protection officials are in discussions to establish ground rules for starting the next period of “tandem” field assessments, in which border officers would operate current systems and the advanced portals simultaneously, she said. Following that the ASP systems would operate only solo field assessments.
The program would then enter the operational test and evaluation phase, which is to be conducted by DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate’s Operational Testing Authority, Kuban said. The testing would measure the ability of the system to meet the needs of an operator. Kuban did not say when the system’s test campaign would be completed. “Each testing event has well-defined entrance and exit criteria that must be met prior to advancing to the next test,” she said.
Fiscal 2010
The fiscal 2010 DHS budget sets aside $20 million for DNDO acquisition and deployment of radiological detection systems “in accordance with the global nuclear detection architecture.” The bill, signed into law 28 October, does not specify how much would go toward the advanced portals program.
As was the case in fiscal 2008, the bill stipulates that none of the funds can be used for “full-scale procurement” of the portal monitors until the homeland security secretary submits a report to congressional appropriators detailing the technology’s operational effectiveness.
It also reiterates that the secretary must submit two certifications and the department “continue to consult with the National Academy of Science before making such certifications.”
A spokeswoman for the National Academy did not return a request by Matishak for comment by deadline.
A decision on certification “will only be made when it has been determined that ASP will increase the probability of detecting dangerous materials while minimizing operational burdens, not based on a predetermined time line,” she said.
