How many times does CBP’s Mark Borkowski get to fail?

According to Borkowski’s, CBP and DHS have learned much from the failures of his SBInet. In fact, just before Napolitano pulled the plug on the program, numerous federal reports had repeatedly documented SBInet’s lack of measurable objectives, assessment procedures, cost overruns, and a list of other failures. Simply put, the fact is that SBInet never worked as promised.

However, according to Borkowski’s recent Congressional testimony, the DHS and CBP finally have learned their lessons. While SBInet was, according to Borkowski, an, “…all-encompassing approach,” DHS and CBP, “…have approached our border technology requirements in more manageable pieces tailored to specific regions on the border…” that include, “…a menu of different, sophisticated technology systems, ranging from small to large, simple to complex.” Borkowski repeatedly told Congress that, in short, DHS and CBP learned not to support new and developing surveillance technology systems and, instead, they are “…leveraging ‘non-developmental items’.” Unfortunately it has taken twebty-five years for CBP to learn this lesson.

Not surprisingly the most costly program in their new Plan is the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) Program that appears to mirror the former SBInet’s lynchpin an attempt to erect a system of fixed towers along several sections of the Arizona border. But, says Borkowski, even though, “…the Plan is admittedly behind schedule I believe our actions have been prudent and have actually resulted in some very positive outcomes.”

Borkowski also testified to Congress that a recent GAO report critical of his progress to date misses its mark (Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, 4 March 2014, GAO-14-411T). “Piece by piece…,” said Borkowski, “…we are building the program management infrastructure that did not exist in the early days of SBInet.” Further, he maintains that, “It is important to consider the latest GAO report in the context of our history to date.”

Borkowski is wise to remind Congress of his agency’s history. A close reading of Congressional testimony reveals, in fact, a mind-boggling trail of incompetence and mismanagement through three decades of agency failures to build integrated surveillance technology along the border. In 1989, long before SBInet, the Border Patrol sought to develop what they called the Intelligent Computer-Aided Detection system (ICAD). ICAD failed miserably, but not before it begat ICAD II complete with claims that the offspring of the system was superior in providing specially trained personnel, called law enforcement communications assistants, who would pass along vital data to CBP agents in the field (Robert Lee Maril, The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.–Mexico Border).

ICAD 11, also a failure, then begat ICAD 111, which now theoretically allowed the system finally to function at a national level and to generate data that would, “…determine patterns and trends in apprehensions and illegal drugs.” However, the credibility of all the ICAD systems was in question from the start as CBP agents in the field continued throughout the ICAD years to distrust the data. Instead, agents were forced to rely upon Vietnam era ground sensors notorious for false alarms.

ICAD 111 begat the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), directed by Walt Drabik. The initial contract was given to International Microwave Corporation for $2 million in a non-competitive contract (this same International Microwave Corporation eventually grew into L-3 Communications). By 2000 Drabik reported that there were 13,000 new ground sensors along the Mexican and Canadian borders replacing the faulty Vietnam era sensors. The sensors were allegedly supported by a remote video surveillance systems including, “…repeater towers, control room monitors, and toggling keyboards to zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras.” ( Maril, The Fence ).

The only problem with ISIS, according to Border Patrol agents who still remember it well, was that it never worked. Under Drabik’s leadership the ISIS components, including ground sensors and cameras, were never successfully integrated into one automated system. Nevertheless, contractors were paid an estimated $239 million for their work on this dysfunctional border technology.

In 2002 ISIS begat the short-lived American Shield Initiative (ASI), soon followed by SBI and the hiring of Boeing, Inc., as “SBI Systems Integrator” for a contract exceeding $1 billion. SBI then begat the Secure Border Initiative Tactical Initiative (SBI TI) and soon Project 28, or just plain P-28, which included a system of fixed towers to be constructed along the Arizona border. Prototypes for the towers were named Tuscon-1 and Ajo-1.

Meanwhile budget estimates to get SBInet and its derivatives up and running had far exceeded costs and, at the same time, failed to meet reasonable performance expectations. Congressional committees charged with oversight finally had enough of a variety of excuses offered by CBP, DHS, Boeing, and Borkowski. After a final critical DHS report, SBInet and P-28 were scrapped. But not, of course, before Boeing had spent all of its $1 billion allocated for the failed project.

History documents in detail that from the beginning of SBInet until its demise, Borkowski frequently testified before congressional committees along with a bevy of other spokesmen for DHS, CBP, and Boeing. As recently as the summer of 2009, Borkowski pronounced that the bugs in SBInet and Project 28 would soon be eliminated and the SBInet system would finally be up and running. In 2009 Borkowksi’s budget for SBInet and related projects was $770 million.

In spite of all these promises over all these years, SBInet was a failure of outstanding proportions and another example of Congressional oversight asleep at the wheel.

In fact Mark Borkowski was so desperate in 2009 to give Congress some good news about his SBInet system that he promised Congress that Tuscon-1 could not fail, that after years of SBInet failures Tucson 1 was finally, “…the installation of the no-kidding real SBI-net system.” ( Maril, The Fence, emphasis added.)

To date the bill for the three ICADS, ISIS, ASI, SBInet and its numerous derivatives exceeds $2 billion. This cost does not include the new charges for DHS and CBP’s newly minted Southern Border and Approaches Campaign or Borkowski’s Plan.

It has taken a quarter of a century for CBP and DHS to compile lessons learned from all the mistakes made in previous programs. A major lesson learned, according to Borkowski and other officials, is that they must purchase existing surveillance technology rather than footing the bill for developing new technology. As well, a second lesson apparently learned after twenty-five years is that Mexican border geography trumps the “one size fits all” technology solution embodied in SBInet.

Before Borkowski took over the leadership of SBInet, he was the executive director for mission support. In this position he was responsible for a $2 billion budget and 17,000 employees. Prior to this position, Borkowski was the director for asset management at CBP including CBP aircraft and marine assets. He was also a program executive at NASA’s Robotic Lunar Exploration Program and an assistant deputy associate administrator at NASA including overseeing the Hubble Space Telescope. For twenty-three years Borkowski served in the U.S. Air Force attaining the rank of Colonel. Borkowski also holds a master’s degree in engineering and a master’s degree in national resource strategy. (Profile: Mark Borkowski, CBP ITIA ASST Commissioner, Executive Government, 7 September 2015).

In 2014 Borkowski was elected into the Wash100, “…a premier group of private and public sector leaders…” who demonstrate “…a consistent commitment to organization excellence, and driving above average value to the American public through strategic vision, innovation and achievement.”

In spite of these credentials, the recent GAO report on the status of Borkowski’s new Plan to provide increased security to our 2,000-mile border with Mexico concludes that there are prevailing unaddressed and crucial problems calling in to question the success of the Plan. These problems resemble the identical problems inherent in SBInet (Nolan Rappaport, “The Secure Border Initiative”, LexusNexis, forthcoming).

Three major programs in Borkowski’s new Plan — the IFT, the Remote Video Surveillance System, and the Mobile Surveillance Capability — account for 97 percent of the billion-dollar contract. The GAO states, however, that in their own analysis of the data about Borkowski’s Plan, goals and objectives required for all three of these programs were most often either “partially met” by CBP or “minimally met.”

In specific CBP also failed to, “…complete documents for acquisition decisions consistent with the guidance…” provided by a previous critical GAO report. This included a reasonable testing of the, “…operational effectiveness and suitability of the system” in more than one border location. At the same time, the GAO states that the CBP, “…has identified mission benefits, but does not capture complete data on the contributions of its surveillance technologies.”

In short, the CBP has not constructed a reasonable way in which to measure the success or failure of its new $1 billion dollar Plan, a stunning repeat of its previous management failures embodied in SBInet.

Under Borkowski the CBP concurred with all these GAO recommendations. That’s good news. The bad news? Borkowski continues to act as if the GAO report is, at worst, a minor setback to the Plan. Perhaps he is counting on the public and Congress not carefully reading the GAO’s detailed report. And perhaps the public and Congress have both forgotten that this CBP nonsense and incompetence have been going on for more than twenty-five years.

How many times does CBP’s Borkowski get to fail?

Robert Lee Maril, a professor of Sociology at East Carolina University, is the author of The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.–Mexico Border. He blogs at leemaril.com.