The challenge of deterrence in today’s world

Mazarr discusses the different definitions and types of deterrence. For example:

General versus immediate deterrence
Finally, the theoretical literature distinguishes between two overlapping time periods in which deterrence policies can be employed. General deterrence is the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in noncrisis situations. Immediate deterrence represents more short-term, urgent attempts to prevent a specific, imminent attack, most typically during a crisis. For example, the United States employed general deterrence for decades by publicizing ongoing promises of defense and punishment if the Soviet Union attacked Western Europe. The United States engaged in the related but distinct task of immediate deterrence during crisis periods, when the United States feared that Soviet aggression against Berlin was imminent.

Most classic studies suggest that general deterrence is easier than immediate deterrence. A potential aggressor may pass long periods without being tempted to take aggressive actions. It is in the specific moments when aggression seems especially enticing or desperately required that deterrence is most at risk, and these moments call for very aggressive and urgent efforts to bolster immediate deterrence. Succeeding during such crises can be especially challenging because the aggressor may have become so committed to a course of action, and so opposed to the idea of backing down, that it has become almost impossible to deter. Therefore, part of the goal of general deterrence is to reduce the need for immediate deterrence— to create deterrent and dissuasion effects that become so ingrained that hesitation to attack becomes habitual.

Some of the study’s important insights:

— Part of the goal of general deterrence is to reduce the need for immediate deterrence—to create deterrent and dissuasion effects that become so ingrained that hesitation to attack becomes habitual.

— If deterrent threats come to be perceived as a general policy of hostility, they may lose their ability to be applied to deter specific actions.

— It is the perceptions of the potential aggressor that matter, not the aggressor’s actual prospects for victory or the objectively measured consequences of an attack.

— An aggressor might also convince itself that the defender will hesitate to follow through on threats to punish because of the attendant risks that the deterring state may not be willing to run once the moment arrives.

— Multiple studies have demonstrated that leaders make situational, rather than dispositional, judgments about resolve—they ask whether a possible defender would fulfill a commitment in a specific case or context, rather than inferring general rules from a defender’s overall track record.

— The notion of “tailored deterrence” has gained renewed attention in recent years. While in essence it merely calls for applying classic deterrence notions to specific cases, it is nonetheless a useful reminder that deterrence does not work in general—it works in specific ways against specific potential aggressors.

Mazarr’s conclusions:

Deterrence as a complex and nuanced enterprise
This summary highlights three factors that should be kept in mind when considering the role of deterrence in U.S. national security strategy:

1. Preventing aggression is not strictly about making threats—it is also about offering assurances. Deterrence is best accomplished through broad-based strategies to dissuade a potential aggressor from seeing the need or opportunity for aggression.

2. Perceptions are everything, and the United States must always view a situation through the lenses of the potential aggressor’s beliefs and preconceptions.

3. Successful deterrence typically involves a combination of taking the aggressor’s motivations seriously, being clear about what the defender seeks to deter and what it will do if the threat is challenged, and taking steps to demonstrate both the capability and determination to fulfill a threat.

In post–World War II cases where the United States has met these three criteria—such as Europe during the Cold War and Korea since 1953—it has generally succeeded in deterrence.