Fighting Russian infowar; judges & election security; George Soros & anti-Semites, and more
Until now, courts have had few opportunities to consider the constitutional dimensions of vote-counting procedures. Voting rights litigation has centered on voter-registration rules, access to the polls, and access to the ballot, rather than the mechanics of counting votes. But with a new focus on election hacking, courts are being invited to scrutinize the sufficiency of different states’ voting systems and their security from intruders. Totenberg’s ruling shows that courts are fully capable of evaluating the risks of different voting technologies—and ordering remedies when they are needed.
Georgia exclusively uses Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines that produce no paper record. These touchscreen machines record votes on a memory card, which is removed at the end of voting and used to transfer the vote totals to county servers for tabulation. Computer scientists who have studied the machines used in Georgia have identified multiple avenues through which attackers could change vote totals on the machines. In fact, the Georgia plaintiffs’ computer-science expert actually executed one such hack in a live demonstration for the court. Separately, Georgia election administrators inadvertently published sensitive voting-related information such as software applications, voter registration information, and ballot-building files on a public website. Taken together, the court found, these features of Georgia’s system exposed voters to a substantial risk of election hacking.
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The ruling is important not just in Georgia, but in other jurisdictions across the country where DRE machines are still in use. Thirteen states currently use DRE machines in at least some jurisdictions; five of them use the machines statewide. Protect Democracy has filed a lawsuit similar to the Georgia case in South Carolina, contending that its statewide use of another type of vulnerable DRE machines violates the constitutional requirements for a secure election system. In the other states that use paperless voting machines, advocates are clamoring for change. The Georgia court’s ruling should be a wake-up call for state legislators who are dragging their feet on replacing out-of-date election technology. The risk of election hacking is real, and change is on the way—even if voters have to take their concerns to court.
Collusion judgment looms for key Senate panel (Morgan Chalfant, The Hill)
The Senate Intelligence Committee is approaching a major decision point in its investigation into Russia’s election interference where lawmakers will weigh in on whether members of President Trump’s campaign colluded with Moscow.
The question risks dividing a panel that has kept a bipartisan facade for nearly two years since the committee began its investigation. The final conclusion is sure to be a major flashpoint in a probe that has largely prodded along behind the scenes, as lawmakers and committee staff interview witnesses and prepare reports on their findings.
How to fight Russian infowar in Central Europe (Radu Magdin, Defense One)
Traditional counter-propaganda techniques are decreasingly effective. The next steps will require focus, engagement, and new thinking.
Colorado Springs on front lines of cyber Cold War with Russia (Tom Roeder, The Gazette)
The Russians have come, and Colorado Springs is a bit shaken after learning that a Putin-directed military intelligence operation purloined data from a local nonprofit.
Without Russia indictments to feast on, scandalmongers feast on scraps (Jack Shafer, Politico)
Mueller’s team has been quiet of late, so reporters are warming up the leftovers.
Combatting Russian Dezinformatsya (Jan Surotchak, IRI)
It’s a sign of the times that a 1980s’ must-read text on Soviet subversion techniques is once again essential reading writes Jan Surotchak, Senior Director for Transatlantic Strategy at the International Republican Institute, a core affiliate of the National Endowment for Democracy, citing Dezinformatsya: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.
Surotchak adds: “Just as in the 1980s, democratic societies and governments across the Transatlantic space find themselves gearing up to defend democratic institutions against attempts by Moscow to subvert them. And while the opponents of democracy certainly have a broader palette of technologies at their disposal than they did in the Cold War, so to do the Western allies have innovative ways to respond. Central to this effort, as in the days of the original dezinformatsya effort is coordinating a democratic response that strengthens the gaps in our own democracies that Moscow seeks to exploit.”