BiothreatsBiotechnology advances offer opportunities for actors with malicious intent

Published 22 March 2019

Over the past decade, the biotechnology economy has experienced remarkable growth, resulting in the rapid expansion of biological knowledge and application. These advances create openings for actors with malicious intent to harness readily available tools and techniques to create biological threats or bioweapons.

Over the past decade, the biotechnology economy has experienced remarkable growth, resulting in the rapid expansion of biological knowledge and application. Such advances have lowered the technical and financial barrier to entry for bioexperimentation outside the traditional environments of academia and industry. Together these developments provide exciting new opportunities for scientific growth. A new RAND report warns, however, that these advances create openings for actors with malicious intent to harness readily available tools and techniques to create biological threats or bioweapons.

In the report, the authors present the results of a workshop designed to convene key experts from diverse stakeholder groups to understand how a genetic database of “sequences of interest” (SOIs) can best support stakeholders — government agencies, academic researchers, and commercial groups — to improve the utility, safety, and security of biotechnology research endeavors. The sessions consisted of a mix of presentations, panel discussions, and small and large group discussions. This report should be viewed as an exploratory first step in discussing a very complex topic with broad and often conflicting stakeholder interests.

Key findings

·  There is a need for broad stakeholder engagement, collaboration, and transparency across government agencies, as well as among the various nongovernment actors in industry and in the research community.

·  There is no consensus on the attributes or boundary conditions that form an operational or implementable definition of an SOI.

·  There is a need for and value in several distinct use cases of SOI databases.

·  Gene synthesis companies would like a federally sanctioned database for screening orders; in contrast, representatives from federal agencies are hesitant to provide regulation beyond the select agent list and the voluntary Department of Health and Human Services screening framework guidance.

·  Several databases exist for the purposes of screening synthetic biology orders; some combination of their design and capabilities may be optimal as a next step for research and development purposes.

·  There is a need to balance access to a database with the associated security risks.

— Read more in by Ritika Chaturvedi et al., Assessing the Need for and Uses of Sequences of Interest Databases (RAND, 2019)