Perspective: Syria withdrawalThe United States Is Done Caring About Syria
The Syria Study Group (SSG) is a bipartisan commission charged by Congress with “examining and making recommendations on the military and diplomatic strategy of the United States with respect to the conflict in Syria.” It published its report on 24 September. The report details five serious threats the conflict within Syria holds for U.S. national security: First, the self-declared Islamic State remains potent, well resourced, and ideologically committed to achieving its goals despite the pounding it has taken over the last five years. Second, Iran’s presence in Syria threatens a wider regional war, given the shadow war between the Israelis and Iranians in the seams of the conflict. Third, if U.S. foreign policy is destined to be shaped by great-power competition, then Russia is using Syria to build influence at the expense of the United States. Fourth, the violence that Bashar al-Assad and his supporters have unleashed on Syria has had far-reaching effects, including the political destabilization of Europe. The members of the study group recommend that the United States should reverse its plans for a military withdrawal in northeastern Syria and focus on stabilization efforts in that area – but Steven Cook writes that “At a level of abstraction, what the authors recommend is eminently reasonable. But given the political context in which they have been offered, most of them were dead before the report was published.” “America should not stand idly by,” the report’s authors urge, but as “they readily acknowledge, America will almost certainly do just that, perfectly reflecting the transition underway in U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East,” Cook writes.
If a congressionally mandated report on a vexing foreign-policy issue is published in Washington in 2019, will anybody pay attention? Probably not, especially these days. So it is with the Syria Study Group (SSG), a bipartisan commission charged by Congress with “examining and making recommendations on the military and diplomatic strategy of the United States with respect to the conflict in Syria.”
Steven A. Cook writes in Foreign Policy that “Perhaps it is the SSG’s bad timing—its final report dropped on Sept. 24, the same day House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced an impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump’s alleged abuse of power” [Cook’s article was published a few days before President’s Trump’s 7 October Twitter announcement that the United States was withdrawing its forces from northern Syria].
Cook writes:
The report hinges on the SSG’s view that within the Syria conflict there are five threats to U.S. national security. First, the self-declared Islamic State remains potent, well resourced, and ideologically committed to achieving its goals despite the pounding it has taken over the last five years. The reports coming out of makeshift prison camps under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces underline the fact that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi still has large numbers of followers and the Islamic State’s leadership remains largely intact. Second, Iran’s presence in Syria threatens a wider regional war, given the shadow war between the Israelis and Iranians in the seams of the conflict. So far Iran’s direct response to Israeli incursions have been minimal, but this only raises the opens the possibility that Iranian leaders will soon encourage its proxies in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to respond on their own. Third, if U.S. foreign policy is destined to be shaped by great-power competition, then Russia is using Syria to build influence at the expense of the United States. From the perspective of leaders in the region, the Russians come across as competent, non-ideological, and credible compared with their U.S. counterparts, who are believed to be mostly incompetent, overly in love with the idea of pushing democracy, and ultimately unreliable.
In addition, the violence that Bashar al-Assad and his supporters have unleashed on Syria has had far-reaching effects, including the political destabilization of Europe. There have long been neo-Nazis in European politics—though for some reason they are routinely referred to as “far right”—but the wave of Syrian refugees in 2015 gave them a political boost in countries including Sweden and Hungary. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party, has scored significant political victories in the eastern part of the country. In Italy, Matteo Salvini, who has flirted with outright fascism, served as interior minister until recently. He is out of government, but there is every reason to believe that he and his supporters will be back. Salvini, the AfD, Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, and France’s National Rally have all capitalized on the presence of Syrians in Europe seeking safety from a horrific war.
Cook adds:
The recommendations for U.S. officials are the weakest part of the SSG report. Not because they aren’t smart. The members of the study group recommend that the United States should reverse its plans for a military withdrawal in northeastern Syria and focus on stabilization efforts in that area, oppose normalization of relations with the Assad regime, pressure the Russians to support a political settlement that is acceptable to the United States, and push the Iranians out of Syria. The group also recommends cooperating with Turkey and addressing its security concerns, working to relieve the humanitarian crisis in Idlib and addressing the terrorist threat there, and finally focusing attention on the humanitarian crisis in Syria as a whole and supporting countries that are hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees.
At a level of abstraction, what the authors recommend is eminently reasonable. But given the political context in which they have been offered, most of them were dead before the report was published. The recommendations section is quite revealing in this regard. It starts out declaring, “The Syria Study Group believes that sound U.S. policy toward Syria demands sustained political commitment by the senior leaders of the U.S. government, as well as a strategy that aligns means and ends.” Yet the members of the group know this is not going to happen—and they admit as much. In the next paragraph, they admit that “the United States is unlikely to dramatically elevate the priority it places on Syria.”
The authors are thus left to exhortation, proclaiming, “America should not stand idly by.” As they readily acknowledge, America will almost certainly do just that, perfectly reflecting the transition underway in U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East.
