Perspective: Iran’s nukesUnderstanding Iran’s Nuclear Escalation Strategy

Published 16 December 2019

Iran is back in the nuclear game. Eric Brewer and Ariane Tabatabi write that the United States and the remaining parties to the Iran nuclear deal must prepare for what may be a significantly more challenging year ahead with additional Iranian nuclear escalatory measures. “By withdrawing from the agreement and already firing its most potent rounds (i.e., oil and banking sanctions), the United States is limited in its ability to deter further Iranian nuclear advances. Iran, on the other hand, still has more chips it can play,” they write.

In May 2019, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani announced that his country would no longer be bound by the nuclear limits under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known simply as the Iran nuclear deal. Eric Brewer and Ariane Tabatabi write in War on the Rocks that Rouhani’s remarks marked the end of a year-long period in which Iran continued implementing the agreement after Washington withdrew from it in May 2018.

Brewer and Tabatabi write:

While ramping up its nuclear activities in contravention of the nuclear deal may seem like an attempt to get a bomb, we don’t think that’s the case. The fact that it is gradually and so publicly violating the deal suggests Iran is, instead, trying to put pressure on the international community to relieve sanctions. Nevertheless, its actions beg the question — what are Iran’s goals? Why has it adopted this strategy? And perhaps most importantly — how far does it intend to go?

Iran is expected to continue to push the nuclear envelope in 2020. If it sticks to its stated schedule of taking a step to reduce its compliance with the JCPOA every two months, Iran will have six more opportunities before the November elections in the United States to increase its nuclear activities. For now, it’s unclear exactly what these steps will entail as the Iranian government has kept these measures close to the chest. But Tehran has already crossed key lines in the agreement, suggesting that if it wants to keep up pressure on the United States and Europe, it might need to go even further in 2020.

Brewer and Tabatabi write that the United States and the remaining parties to the JCPOA must prepare for what may be a significantly more challenging year ahead with additional Iranian nuclear escalatory measures. “By withdrawing from the agreement and already firing its most potent rounds (i.e., oil and banking sanctions), the United States is limited in its ability to deter further Iranian nuclear advances. Iran, on the other hand, still has more chips it can play,” they write.