The Role of (Dis)Trust in Disengagement and Deradicalization

Alongside this, if there is a dissipation in abstract trust of an ideology there can be clear opportunities for both disengagement and deradicalization. This is present in relation to both program-based and natural exit from terrorism.

In their 2015 assessment of the disengagement and deradicalization literature, Gill, Bouhana, and Morrison identified 13 core reasons for disengagement. Of these, eight factors can be directly linked to the dichotomous theme of (dis)trust, namely:

·  Mistreatment

·  Ideological differences

·  Differences in tactical preferences

·  Differences in strategic preferences

·  Disillusionment with group hypocrisy

·  Unmet expectations

·  Cognitive dissonance

·  Loss of social support

We can see that these factors are linked to a deterioration in abstract, functional, and personal trust. Those who have differences in tactical or strategic preferences or have witnessed a loss in social support may no longer trust the terrorist organization to achieve its end goals, and thus have a deterioration in functional trust.

There may be a deterioration in personal trust if the individual is the victim of, or witnesses, mistreatment at the hands of the leadership or rank and file membership. This may also decline if there is perceived group hypocrisy, as those who have ideological differences or have experienced cognitive dissonance through their sympathetic treatment by those with the security forces, may experience a deterioration in abstract trust.

Trust as a filter
Within the systematic review of the disengagement and deradicalization literature (dis)trust was identified as playing a key filtering role in the disengagement and deradicalization decision-making processes. It was found that the opportunities to leave a terrorist organization are more likely to be successful when they are offered by an individual, organization, or entity that is perceived by the would-be defector as being trustworthy. The same opportunity provided by a distrusted or less trusted entity is significantly less likely to lead to an organizational exit.

Trust is most important at the initial stages of disengagement. However, if one is to have a sustained exit, these and other trusting relationships must be maintained.

Connected to this is the role of distrust. When one becomes disillusioned with the membership and/or leadership of the terrorist organization this can lead to heightened levels of distrust, which, in turn, can be a push factor driving an individual out of the group.

What was presented in the review already largely shows how the deterioration in trust within the terrorist organization can push a person towards their exit. However, similarly positive trusting relationships with those external from the movement can have the positive effect of pulling a person out of the extremist organization.

Trust and Program
Considering all of this, when establishing a disengagement or deradicalization program, paying attention to who would deliver such a program is as important as the content of the program, potentially even more important. Furthermore, the local context is key when deciding on who is best placed to lead and deliver the program.

Knowing who is most trusted and distrusted and by who is essential knowledge in the design stage of any successful program. This must be constantly reviewed and reassessed throughout the delivery of the program, as the trusted actors and institutions can and do change.

If those running the programs are trusted, there is more likely to be a positive attitude towards the program. This positive attitude, shaped by social relations and personal trust, has been found to be a key predictor in the ultimate success of the program and has been proposed as a prerequisite to any effective analysis of any individual going through a disengagement, deradicalization, or reintegration program. Without that trust, an individual’s engagement in the extremist lifestyle may be further prolonged.

A lack of trust is a particular issue when designing state-sponsored CVE or reintegration initiatives. This can be elevated by any perceived lack of transparency in relation to partnerships. With the state viewed by terrorists as the enemy, a purely state-sponsored initiative will find significant difficulties in achieving the trust necessary to succeed. Therefore, NGOs may, at times, be best placed to succeed in any disengagement or deradicalization initiative, as their status is not inherently tied to the political establishment that many of those disengaging will have been fighting against, potentially, for years.

It is the trust which NGOs can garner, due to their ostensible independence, that provides the opportunity for former extremists to be open to the external actors assisting in their exit – this is most pertinent during the initial stages of physical disengagement when they take the crucial step of trusting an organization to assist in their transition to a new life. However, if this trust was to be questioned at a later stage in this process there is still the possibility of it negatively affecting the continuation of the disengagement process.

Formers
One may naturally consider formers acting as mentors as being among the most trusted. However, a former extremist does not intrinsically bolster an individual’s credibility or trustworthiness, as these mentors must often retain the perception of independence from the state in the eyes of their mentees. This is in parallel to maintaining the trust of any existing state sponsors, which can be a difficult balancing act, as by accepting governmental funding, a mentor’s credibility can be undermined. Therefore, to be effective, these mentors must be given the freedom to demonstrate some level of independence from state-run organizations where it is possible, safe, and ethical.

In Summary
When designing a disengagement or deradicalization program, there needs to be careful consideration of the organization and/or individual(s) delivering the program and how much they are trusted or distrusted by the individuals and communities the program is designed for. The trusted individuals and organizations will potentially differ by location, therefore, there needs to also be the requisite local knowledge when designing and implementing the programs, and time spent developing the trust which will enable the successful application of the program(s).

This article is published courtesy of the Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST).