ARGUMENT: Nuclear threshold stateIrreversible: Iran’s Nukes
In 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran, which the Obama administration had signed in 2015. David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of Institute for Science and International Security write that Iran’s nuclear capabilities now greatly exceed their status in early 2016, when the nuclear deal was implemented. Iran’s breakout time, namely the time needed to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon or explosive device, is on order of one month, which was Iran’s breakout time in late 2014, before the nuclear deal was signed.
Over the last several months, Iran has continued to advance its sensitive nuclear programs, largely unhindered by weeks of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, Iranian presidential elections, criticism from the G7, Britain, France, the United States, and the European Union (EU), and unresolved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards probes.
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of Institute for Science and International Security write in a new report that
In many ways, Iran’s nuclear capabilities now greatly exceed their status in early 2016, when the JCPOA was implemented. Its breakout time, namely the time needed to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon or explosive device, is on order of one month, rivaling breakout timelines prior to the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) in late 2014. Although Iran would need more time to build a nuclear explosive devise or even longer to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, it has extensive experience in developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons and is ready to build its first one on short order
With its multiple violations of the JCPOA, Iran has reached previously uncharted territory, accumulating important new knowledge, experience, and practice, representing a significant block of nuclear capability banned to Iran by this point in time under the JCPOA. These advances not only violate the JCPOA limits, but many are irreversible, threatening to collapse the JCPOA’s overall purpose of keeping Iran a certain timeframe away from being able to produce enough weapon grade uranium (WGU) for a nuclear weapon and assemble a nuclear weapon. The irreversible advances, which accelerate both Iran’s WGU production and weaponization capability, have occurred mainly in three areas: (1) advanced gas centrifuge production and operation, (2) highly enriched uranium (HEU) production, and (3) uranium metal production.
