Avoiding NATO-Russia War | Why Deterrence Failed in Ukraine | Putin: Inept Strategist, and more

·  “Second, U.S. and NATO intelligence-sharing with Ukraine appears acceptable under the rules. Intelligence officials gather information about Russian forces from various sources, including satellite imagery and communication intercepts, and can quickly pass that to the Ukrainian military. There are some limitations on what is provided, in part out of concern that Russian intelligence officers may have penetrated the Ukrainian military.”

·  “Third, the rules permit at least some Western arms shipments to Ukraine. In the weeks before and since Russian forces attacked, the United States, NATO member-states and others have provided a stream of defense assistance to Ukraine, including man-portable anti-aircraft missiles and anti-armor missiles such as the Stinger and Javelin. While many weapons were flown directly into Ukraine prior to Feb. 24, it now appears that they enter Ukraine via land routes.”

·  “Fourth, economic and other sanctions appear acceptable, if disliked, within the tacit rules, even if they went well beyond what the Kremlin might have anticipated. … It is unclear what the sides are doing in the covert world of cyberspace. Difficulties in attribution may lead countries to believe that they can take certain cyber actions without fear of retaliation.  In any case, it is difficult to see any tacit rules in this area.”

·  “To the extent that the United States, NATO and Russia abide by these kinds of tacit rules, they can reduce the prospect of a direct military clash. However, tensions between the sides are high, and Russia is conducting a full-scale war against Ukraine. As some rules and red lines are not clear, they leave a risk of miscalculation and conflict that neither side presumably wants.”

The False Promise of Arming Insurgents: America’s Spotty Record Warrants Caution in Ukraine  (Lindsey O’Rourke, Foreign Affairs)

·  “The United States’ record for covertly arming foreign dissidents is remarkably poor. … [O]ut of 35 U.S. attempts to covertly arm foreign dissidents during the Cold War, only four succeeded in bringing U.S. allies to power. Notably, an early U.S. operation to support Ukrainian nationalists in their bid to secede from the Soviet Union during the early Cold War was a failure.”

·  “If a Ukrainian insurgency takes hold and the United States and its Western allies back it, the harder Russia will repress the Ukrainian people in response. … Unlike the West, Russia views Ukraine as a vital strategic interest, and Russia’s conventional military superiority and geographic proximity to the country would allow them to easily deploy and replenish their air and ground forces. Moreover, Ukraine’s terrain is ill-suited to support an insurgency.”

·  “If a Ukrainian insurgency were to falter, the United States might be tempted to dispatch special operations forces into Russian-occupied territories. If these troops were killed or captured by Russian forces, the risks of escalation would grow even stronger.”

·  “A final case for intervention is that, regardless of the ultimate outcome, arming an insurgency would dramatically increase the costs of a Russian occupation, just as U.S. support for jihadi insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1980s helped undermine the Soviet Union. … While the Afghan rebels did succeed in driving out the Soviets, it came at enormous cost to the Afghan people. … Afghanistan is also the quintessential example of the unintentional blowback … [T]hat U.S. intervention ended up paving the way for the Taliban to take over Afghanistan and eventually provide a safe haven for al Qaeda terrorists.”

·  “U.S. policymakers, moreover, should be prepared to remain involved in Ukraine for the long haul if an insurgency does indeed take hold and the administration backs it. According to a 2010 RAND study, the average modern insurgency lasts ten years and ends in defeat.  … While covertly coming to their aid may appear to be the prudent choice among an array of unattractive options, history suggests that it is a risky gamble.”

How Russia’s Revamped Military Fumbled the Invasion of Ukraine   (Thomas Grove and Stephen Fidler, Wall Street Journal)

·  “The Russians didn’t follow their own doctrine of launching the campaign with the Russian version of ‘shock and awe’ under which they would have established superiority in the air and on the ground through rapid and massive deployment of weaponry. Instead, the Russians attempted to send in light forces deep into Ukraine that were poorly equipped to repel fierce resistance and far from supply lines.”

·  “Mr. Putin ‘really thought this was an illegitimate government that would quickly fall,’ said CNA’s Mr. Kofman. ‘It’s clear he never left 2014, he really hasn’t understood anything that’s happened since 2014.’ … After failing in phase one, Russian tactics seem to have switched to terrorizing cities perhaps in search of a favorable political settlement.”

·  “Some military analysts expect the critical next phase to be around Kyiv where Russia likely plans to encircle the capital, blockade it and shell it into submission. This would replicate tactics used by the Russian army … during the second Chechen war that reasserted Moscow’s control over the predominantly Muslim statelet in 2000.”

·  “Russia—whose economy before the invasion was about the size of Italy’s—may have spread its efforts too thinly and the modernization effort also appears to have been undermined by fraud and corruption, said analysts including Michael Clarke, a former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank, and now associate director of the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, citing estimates that some 25% of the invading force are conscripts.”

·  “Weapons systems haven’t performed well and commanders pretended they had capabilities that weren’t there, Mr. Clarke said. Of Russia’s effort to create a ‘large, modern army,’ he said: ‘The part which is modern is not large, and the part which is large is not modern.’”

Why Deterrence Failed in Ukraine   (Nadia Schadlow, Wall Street Journal)

·  “Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.”

·  “The U.S. spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the U.S. had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.”

·  “The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate.’ That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Mr. Putin’s ability or willingness to do so.”

·  “Could this conflict have been averted with a more convincing demonstration of American resolve? We will never know for sure. Deterrence is an art, not a science. But the U.S. almost certainly faces a challenge if it wants to keep the peace in the future. Restoring the perception of American will to deter conflict may, ironically, require an even more forceful manifestation of that will on the battlefield. In a world of diminished deterrence, the desire for peace could make conflict more certain.”

Putin’s Folly: A Case Study of an Inept Strategist  (Joshua Rovner, War on Rocks)

·  “Vladimir Putin is a bad strategist. He does not understand the relationship between force and politics, and he is incapable of predicting international reactions to his ham-fisted military campaigns. … Today, his misuse of Russian power is leading Russia towards impoverishment and isolation.”

·  “Misperception, escalation and war termination are fundamental strategic challenges. They are especially challenging when the adversary is a bad strategist. How can the Biden administration cope with the problem today? While there are no textbook solutions to this problem, the administration might start by reconsidering how it uses the intelligence community. … [I]ntelligence transparency has reached the point of declining marginal returns.”

·  “Secret intelligence might be useful for managing all three of the problems described above. Intelligence agencies have a long history of clandestine communications with wartime adversaries. Spy chiefs can communicate with their counterparts outside the public eye, gauging the response to diplomatic messages. … Of course, this can only work if both sides have reason to believe that their communications will remain secret.”

·  “Intelligence agencies might also help reduce the danger of escalation. Historically, wartime covert action has acted as a release valve among great powers, a means of competing with one another that does not require the kind of violence that can get out of control.”

·  “Finally, secret intelligence might help stop the fighting. It can establish quiet channels for peace feelers, outside the view of domestic spoilers on all sides. It might also reduce the credibility problem by monitoring Russian compliance with the terms of any possible deal. Leaders will be rightfully skeptical of Russian promises. Diligent intelligence work will at least provide faith that there will be early warning if the peace starts to break down. The fact that the intelligence community gave accurate warning before the war surely bolsters their own credibility with policymakers.”

Escalation Vortex: Nuclear Risks in the Russia-Ukraine War   (Angela Kellett and Chase A. Enright, National Interest)

·  “President Vladimir Putin’s recent order to put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert sparked panic that the situation in Ukraine could go nuclear. Russia and the United States have the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, so the notion that President Putin would even consider using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is unsettling.”

·  “What exactly does the increased nuclear alert level mean? According to Jon Wolfsthal, Global Zero’s Senior Advisor, this relates to changes in Russia’s personnel readiness. While the heightened alert may ultimately be considered a more symbolic decision, the fact that President Putin is willing to transmit this signal to the world — that the possibility of nuclear use is not out of the equation — reinforces the concern that nuclear war is not an impossibility in this current crisis.”

·  “This isn’t the first time that Putin’s Russia has acted this aggressively. Wolfsthal notes that “we’ve seen Vladimir Putin’s horrific behavior towards Chechnya, towards Syria, towards Russians in Russia.” Rather than providing a path to understanding Putin, these past examples of Russian aggression reinforce his skewed cost-benefit calculus, thus making it difficult for experts and policy-makers to predict what he will do next.”

·  “Russia believes that it can invade Ukraine without military action from the United States, as the risk of nuclear conflict is too high. At the same time, the United States believes it can provide military aid to Ukraine without Russian retaliation due to the increased nuclear risk it would create. However, when the nuclear threshold is broken, the paradox breaks as well, and both the United States and Russia may find themselves in an escalating vortex that will be very difficult to escape.”

The “Military Aspects” picks section, originally published in Russia Matters, is published here courtesy of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Russia Matters.