ELECTION SECURITYWho Cares about a Midterm Election? Comparing Russia, Iran, and China’s Electoral Interference from Past to Present
Midterm elections present a complicated target environment for foreign manipulators because, unlike presidential elections, there is no single candidate who can significantly alter U.S. foreign policy. But interference opportunities remain, and adversaries have the potential to advance their strategic objectives through a campaign meant to create further turbulence within U.S. democracy.
The 2020 presidential election cycle was abnormally long, with chaos, debate about the outcome, and an insurrection before it finally concluded—at least officially—on inauguration day in January 2021. Now just over a year later, the United States must shift to prepare for the defense of yet another election: the 2022 midterms.
Midterm elections present a complicated target environment for foreign manipulators because, unlike presidential elections, there is no single candidate who can significantly alter U.S. foreign policy. But interference opportunities remain, and adversaries have the potential to advance their strategic objectives—including but certainly not limited to undermining U.S. opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine—through a campaign meant to create further turbulence within U.S. democracy.
The United States has now experienced persistent electoral interference since 2016, with the most prominent and potentially damaging interference arising from an often opportunistic but sometimes deliberate triad of authoritarian regimes: Russia, Iran, and China. Each has demonstrated an interest and commitment to online influence operations targeting U.S. audiences. Russia, the most well-known foreign manipulator, spearheaded election interference techniques through its active measures campaigns beginning in 2014 and going through the 2016 election. But since that election, a wide set of actors—including other authoritarian nation states and an array of advanced persistent manipulators (APM)—have blurred the lines between nation states and non-state actors, foreign and domestic interference, and online and in-person manipulation.
Today, Russia remains the principle state interfering in U.S. elections, but with their attention diverted by their war in Ukraine and their ability to influence, at least overtly, degraded by the closing of RT America, it remains to be seen if they have the resources to mount a sustained influence campaign. Russia also met challenges from the U.S. government and social media companies in both the 2018 and 2020 elections, resulting in lesser effects and higher costs.
