Russia’s Problems on the Battlefield Stem from Failures at the Top
Beneath Putin lies the Russian military infrastructure, much of which is directly involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The initial invasion was top heavy, involving no fewer than four of Russia’s military district headquarters. This introduced a great deal of bureaucracy and slowed decision making.
Russia’s military additionally struggles to coordinate the different components of its forces – land and air, for example – and get them to work properly together. By contrast, the Ukrainian side has been much more flexible, demonstrating the ability to react rapidly where needed.
On the ground, a lack of confidence in commanders has been apparent since the beginning of the war, corroding the morale of frontline soldiers.
Russia has lost an alarming number of its senior officers to enemy fire. More junior officers are either not empowered to make decisions without oversight or lack confidence, so senior commanders have had to maintain a direct presence on the battlefield to provide direction and motivation.
The absence of effective communication technology has compounded this issue, placing generals into the line of fire. These measures have apparently done little to mitigate Russian command failings.
Fear of Failure
Why doesn’t the Russian military adapt its command structure? It can’t. It has been aware of these shortcomings for some time, and while it has tried to take action to improve the abilities of its forces to make quick decisions through both technology and reforms to military doctrine, these have failed to make an impact.
Even in 2022, the contemporary Russian military is still struggling to overcome its Soviet legacy of rigid command structures and top-down decision making. An ingrained fear of failure does not permit risk or experimentation on the battlefield while the capacity for field commanders to make rapid decisions is also in doubt.
Following orders from the top has become ingrained in the hierarchy. These are deep-rooted issues that are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
The latest setback in Kharkiv is just one of the many consequences of Russian command failings. They keep happening because a prerequisite for learning from these events is recognising that they have taken place. While increasingly both Russian nationalist sources and even senior commanders are questioning the way the conflict is being contested, these concerns are unlikely to translate into a learning opportunity without acknowledgement from Moscow.
It is worth noting that the lack of flexibility and independence within the Russian military is no accident, but an important feature that reflects the paranoia of Russian leadership.
Indeed, the command rigidity that Russia is displaying on the battlefield could perhaps be traced back to the coup-proofing actions described earlier. While connected to battlefield failings, it may well be the case that these measures help Putin ward off the building domestic consequences his disastrous Ukrainian campaign.
As the progress of events forces Putin to refocus on his position and personal security, it is likely that Russian forces will continue to flounder abroad.
Christopher Morris is Teaching Fellow, School of Strategy, Marketing and Innovation, University of Portsmouth. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
