Russia’s Dangerous Decline | Trigger-Happy North Korea | South American Lithium, and more

Putin reacted to Russia’s falling fortunes in Ukraine just as he did to its shrinking role on the world stage: dealt a losing hand, he doubled down on his risky bet. To Putin’s evident surprise, the war in Ukraine has accelerated long-standing trends pushing his country toward decline. Europe is moving to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, diminishing both the country’s leverage over the continent and the government revenues that depend heavily on energy exports. Unprecedented international sanctions and export controls are limiting Russia’s access to capital and technology, which will cause Moscow to fall even further behind in innovation. A year ago, we argued in these pages that reports of Russia’s decline were overstated and that Russia was poised to remain a persistent power—a country facing structural challenges but maintaining the intent and capabilities to threaten the United States and its allies. Putin’s disastrous invasion underscored the dangers of dismissing the threat from Russia, but it has also hastened the country’s decline. Today, Russia’s long-term outlook is decidedly dimmer.
Given these factors, there will be a strong temptation to downgrade Russia as a threat. That would be a mistake, and not just because the war has yet to be won. In Ukraine and elsewhere, the more vulnerable Moscow perceives itself to be, the more it will try to offset those vulnerabilities by relying on unconventional tools—including nuclear weapons. In other words, Russian power and influence may be diminished, but that does not mean Russia will become dramatically less threatening. Instead, some aspects of the threat are likely to worsen. For the West, recognizing that reality means abandoning any near-term hopes of a chastened Russia and maintaining support for Russia’s targets. That effort should begin in Ukraine: the United States and its allies must provide sustained support to Kyiv to ensure that Russia suffers a defeat. But even if Putin loses, the problem that Russia poses will not be solved. In many ways, it will grow in intensity. So, too, should the response to it.

The Uncertain Politics of South American Lithium  (Richard M. Sanders, National Interest)
If the so-called “lithium triangle” countries are to supply demand while maximizing their benefits and minimizing the costs from any bonanza, they will need to thread the needle carefully as they make policies for this sector.

North Korea Goes Trigger Happy with New Missile Tests  (Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, Foreign Policy)
The newest rounds of escalation come as both the U.S. and South Korean government predict North Korea is readying to carry out a nuclear weapons test, which would be its seventh since 2006.
A new nuclear test would lay bare how few options Washington has left in its diplomatic playbook to try and convince North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. High-level talks between former U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim ended in failure. The Biden administration has said its door remains open to talks with North Korea at any time, but so far, those overtures have been met with total radio silence.

What Europe Can Learn From the 1973 Oil Shock  (Stephen G. Gross, Foreign Policy)
This is not Europe’s first energy crisis. Nearly 50 years ago, the European Community—the EU’s predecessor—faced its first energy shock during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when OPEC quadrupled the price of crude oil and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries fully embargoed oil flowing to the United States, the Netherlands, and several other countries for taking staunchly pro-Israel stances in the conflict. Many thought these actions would destroy Western Europe’s prosperity, which over the previous 25 years had been built on access to remarkably cheap hydrocarbons; at the time, oil comprised around 60 percent of Europe’s energy mix.
Much like today, the 1973 oil shock also created the potential for reform—elevating energy security as a goal and allowing environmentalist agendas to gain momentum. Confronting such a large-scale challenge required collective action and seemed to bode well for a more unified Europe. But the European Community ultimately missed its chance to build a greener and more resilient economy. National interests quickly took over, politicizing fuel prices and preventing meaningful integration within the European Community on energy issues. By the 1980s, new investments in oil and natural gas exploration had solidified hydrocarbons as the dominant energy source powering Europe’s economies.
One lesson from Europe’s 1973 crisis is this: Without a coherent regional strategy, the dual imperatives of greening an economy and ensuring energy security may not be enough to overpower the allure of cheap fossil fuels. If today’s European leaders are to avoid this pitfall, they must harness the turbulence created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to break the chains of fossil fuels—together.

U.N. Inspectors Find No Evidence for Russian ‘Dirty Bomb’ Claim  (New York Times)
The International Atomic Energy Agency examined three sites where Russia claimed Ukraine was building a radiation dispersal bomb but turned up no indications of illicit activity.