·  Biosurveillance capabilities remain largely tied to specific pre-identified threats. Governments and international institutions need to develop a wider set of pathogen-agnostic tools designed to detect any potential novel or deliberate threat.

·  Many biosurveillance and early warning efforts lack the resources necessary to be sustainable over the long term. Indeed, some existing capacities may see reduced or halted operations if new funding streams do not arise soon. 

·  The absence of a standardized approach to assessing the quality of early-warning systems and biosurveillance coverage.

·  Within the United States in particular, data sharing and transparency are still insufficient, both across different federal agencies and from state and local public health systems to federal counterparts. 

·  Although major stakeholders around the world have highlighted the need for comprehensive global early warning systems, no state or international institution has advanced a concrete plan designed to take this challenge on. 

Although these gaps are significant, genuine pathogen early warning systems are not out of reach, and many of the necessary digital and technical tools are already available. CSR has therefore laid out a series of recommendations for immediate and near-term action across the U.S. interagency, the global community, and key U.S. partners. These include:

·  The U.S. government must establish a clear strategy for the CDC’s Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, including guidance for how the new center will engage with other agencies across the U.S. government.

·  The Department of Defense (DoD) should ensure that its biosurveillance activities and agencies are optimally organized, integrated, and attached to its technology development planning to ensure it provides leaders with timely threat assessments from a variety of sources and evolves ahead of threats.

·  DoD should plan and pilot a pathogen-agnostic early-warning system at several strategic military bases and facilities. This could act as a trial-run for a larger national or international system. 

·  The U.S. government must increase its engagement with the private sector. Companies, including biotech firms, can provide unique data and advanced capabilities that are vital for effective biosurveillance and early warning. 

·  Governments around the world should prioritize developing interoperable biosurveillance systems. This should lay the groundwork for new cross-border and regional early-warning systems.

·  Affluent states should extend existing partnerships and develop new programs designed to bolster biosurveillance efforts in resource-limited and remote settings across the globe.

·  Governments and international organizations worldwide should actively pursue a global early-warning framework. 

CSR is releasing this report at a critical juncture for national and international biosecurity efforts. Fatigue from COVID-19 and decreasing interest in biological threat reduction pose a real threat to global efforts to address the outbreaks of today and the dangers of tomorrow. Returning to the status quo will not suffice, and experts agree that the drivers and incidence of biological threats will only increase over time. 

As an independent nonprofit, CSR will continue its work to support and encourage stakeholders as they consider the guidance offered throughout this report, and help fill the gaps in efforts to chart actionable steps forward. Given how high the stakes are for all actors working to address biological threats, we must continue to push for urgent advancement toward effective pathogen early warning systems.