How China’s Maritime Militia Takes Advantage of the Grey Zone

The organizations with which the maritime militia collaborates are likely to vary depending on the situation. It coordinates with official government vessels for asserting maritime rights and interests in relatively low-intensity grey-zone areas, such as communications operations in disputed areas and surveillance of foreign fishing and research vessels. It also works with military organizations to conduct intelligence operations in grey-zone areas and interdiction activities against foreign military vessels, as well as relatively intense paramilitary operations, such as support and replenishment for the military in wartime and participation in military operations. The Chinese government may believe that mobilizing the maritime militia can control the escalation of a crisis, rein in the adversary, avoid military skirmishes and expand China’s effective control of certain areas.

Following Xi’s 2013 visit to a maritime militia force in Hainan province, the Chinese government stepped up its support for maritime militia units operating in the South China Sea. Government authorities provide fuel subsidies and subsidies for the construction and repair of fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. The number of vessels dedicated to maritime militia has increased significantly in recent years. Installation of the BeiDou satellite navigation system is well underway, with 70,000 Chinese fishing vessels equipped with the system as of 2020.

Beijing’s increasing control over the maritime militia will allow the central government’s intentions to be reflected at the grassroots. This may give two policy options to the Chinese government. Against a strong opponent, such as the US military, the maritime militia can be deployed to obstruct and check its actions and communicate China’s intentions while avoiding military escalation. For example, in the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident in the South China Sea, the Chinese side reportedly interfered with US operations not with its navy but by mobilizing nearby Chinese fishing boats.

On the other hand, if a small country is the adversary, the maritime militia can carry out extreme provocations to lure the adversary’s armed forces to take military action and justify its own military retaliation, which could result in heightening overall tensions. Indeed, in the so-called Battle of the Paracel Islands in January 1974, when China seized the islands from South Vietnam, which until then had effectively controlled and occupied them, Chinese fishing boats suspected to be part of the maritime militia repeatedly engaged in provocative behavior in the nearby waters even before military skirmishes began.

Which policy the Chinese government chooses will depend on its relationship with the opponent country. If it feels that inadvertent friction would be disadvantageous to it, it will not use the maritime militia to climb the escalation ladder. However, if it feels that using the maritime militia could expand China’s interests or deter the other side, it will be proactive in its use.

Given these policy implications, Australia and Japan need to signal to China that use of the maritime militia will be disadvantageous because it will increase distrust and weaken China’s relations with neighboring countries. The Australian and Japanese governments have already expressed their concerns about China’s ‘dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia’ in joint statements. It is also important to nullify the use of maritime militias and deal with dangerous activities by fishing vessels by deepening practical cooperation, such as expanding cooperation between Australian and Japanese maritime law enforcement agencies and joint military exercises.

In order to coexist with China, which is expanding its interests backed by military power, Australia and Japan need to communicate their interests and threat perception and avoid unnecessary accidents. At the same time, it is important to make China realize that in a conflict in which Australia and Japan are actors, it will not gain any advantage from using its maritime militia. This is a way for Australia and Japan to seek stable relationships with China at sea in the long term.

Masaaki Yatsuzuka is a senior fellow at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and a visiting fellow at ASPI.This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).