ELECTION SECURITYMoving to Evidence-Based Elections

By Barbara Simons and Poorvi Vora

Published 21 March 2023

In most jurisdictions things went relatively smoothly in the November 2022 midterms, but serious issues, both technical and political, remain. Elections may be made more transparent and secure through the use of voter-marked paper ballots and rigorous postelection audits.

In most jurisdictions things went relatively smoothly in the November 2022 midterms, but serious issues, both technical and political, remain. As we discuss below, elections may be made more transparent and secure through the use of voter-marked[1] paper ballots and rigorous postelection audits.  

Concerns in the Midterm Elections
The midterm elections were not as contentious as many had feared, but harassment of election officials and poll workers of both political parties has persisted. For example, on election night Bill Gates, the Republican chair of the Maricopa County (AZ) governing board, had to go into hiding because of threats. In Cobb County, GA, a suspect was arrested for interfering with poll workers and slapping a voter. Police were called in Cascade County, MT, because protesters were circling outside waiting for election officials. And an Arizona judge ordered masked and armed “observers” to keep some distance from ballot drop boxes. Safety fears have triggered election official resignations and made recruitment of poll workers more difficult.[2]

In addition, unanticipated technical problems occurred and are likely to continue to occur in every large election. Fast and accurate information is needed to explain both the problems and, where feasible, the workarounds. For example, in Maricopa County, some polling place printers produced blank ballots (for voters to mark by hand) that were too faint for the polling place scanners to read (they were readable by central scanners). Although the printing problem generated conspiracy theories among some, election officials and the press quickly informed voters that they could deposit their completed ballots in ballot boxes for later tabulation. Or they could vote at a different location if they first surrendered their marked ballot. 

Other problems were not so benign. In Harris County, TX, all polling place voters use computerized ballot marking devices (BMDs). The voter makes her selection on the BMD which then prints out a paper copy of her ballot for scanning. Because many Harris County BMDs did not have enough paper, some voters were asked to leave and return later to vote. It’s likely that some voters who couldn’t return were thus disenfranchised.  

Similar problems, combined with skepticism about computerized voting systems, can lead a portion of the electorate to distrust legitimate election results. We describe how the use of paper ballots and postelection audits can improve election transparency and help inform public discourse.