IRAN’S NUKESSurvey of Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges - March 2023
Iran continues to deploy advanced centrifuges at its three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow in violation of the limitations outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). InFebruary 2021, Iran stopped providing declarations about its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes, bellows, and rotor assemblies, and blocked the IAEA access to IAEA cameras recording activities in the enrichment facilities. In June 2022, Iran removed the IAEA cameras from the enrichment facilities, so no recordings exist. Consequently, the IAEA has had no ability to take inventory.
The Institute for Science and International security has just released an updated survey of Iran’s advance uranium enrichment centrifuges.
Here are the Survey’s “Background” and “Findings” sections:
Background
· This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) quarterly report for February 28, 2023, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and the quarterly safeguards report for March 4, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
· Iran continues to deploy advanced centrifuges at its three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow in violation of the limitations outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
· In the event of a revival of the JCPOA, under rules embodied in the existing JCPOA, Iran would be permitted to mothball its advanced centrifuges, shortening Iran’s potential breakout timeline and increasing its ability to build up its capability should the deal collapse or once enrichment capacity restrictions phase out starting in 2025.
· Since February 2021, Iran has not provided declarations about its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes, bellows, and rotor assemblies or allowed IAEA verification, as specified in the JCPOA. While data and recordings were collected by IAEA surveillance equipment up until June 2022, the IAEA has not had access to those data and recordings, and since June 2022, when Iran removed the cameras, no such recordings exist. Consequently, the IAEA has had no ability to take inventory.
· Iran has been producing near 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) in advanced centrifuge cascades since April 2021.
Findings
· Since the last quarterly report in November, based on data in the most recent quarterly report, Iran installed 1248 advanced centrifuges, all at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Of these, 1044 are IR-2m centrifuges, organized in six cascades. The rest were IR-4 centrifuges, in one cascade.
· Overall, Iran has 12,994 centrifuges installed at all three of its enrichment plants; 5763 advanced centrifuges of various types and 7231 IR-1 centrifuges.
· Between February 2022 to February 2023, Iran nearly tripled its annual deployment of advanced centrifuges to over 3500 advanced centrifuges deployed during that time span, compared to the deployment of about 1200 advanced centrifuges observed between February 2022 and February 2021, which itself was double that from the year prior, February 2020 to February 2021, during which roughly 500 advanced centrifuges were deployed.
