The Origin of SARS-CoV-2: Animal Transmission or Lab Leak?
Some lab-leak proponents point to a viral strain called RaTG13, known to be at the WIV, which has a 96.2 percent similarity to SARS-CoV-2. However, that 3.8 percent dissimilarity is not isolated in one chunk in the viral genome; it is differences sprinkled throughout, especially in the last base pair of the codons, indicating that there may be more than a decade of viral evolution separating the strains. There have been accusations that so-called gain of function (GOF) research (GOF) could have turned RaTG13 into SARS-CoV-2, but unfortunately virology research tools do not include magic wands and no plausible scientific pathway has been offered to explain how such a transformation could occur. No progenitor strain to SARS-CoV-2 has been associated with the laboratory.
Other arguments involve whether the lab-leak theory was taken seriously in the beginning (it was), whether the Chinese government was lying (it was, including about the seriousness of the virus and that the United States played a role in causing the pandemic), and whether there were safety problems at the lab (selectively edited State Department cables suggested yes, but the full cables suggest otherwise). Adherents of these theories often call for a full investigation, but this is not likely to happen after the WHO expert processes ended prematurely amid the political backlash to the report’s conclusion that a lab leak was “very unlikely.” Regardless, any new evidence that implicates the WIV also needs to make sense given what we already know from the other existing evidence—patient samples, geospatial analysis, genetic indications of animal infections, the multiple versions of SARS-CoV-2 in early samples, environmental samples—all of which point to an animal origin. For these theories to be credible, new evidence implicating the lab as being involved must complement what is known but shift the conclusion to origination at the laboratory. This evidence has not yet emerged, and it would be extraordinary if it does.
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Not all lab-leak proponents believe the same things, and multiple motivations energize this belief. Some people are concerned about GOF research (which is poorly defined and hard to characterize) or virology research, generally, and would like to increase restrictions on research in the belief that this would prevent the creation of dangerous pathogens that may then leak from a lab. New recommendations put forth by an advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services could, if implemented, place limits not only on virology research and public health surveillance but even vaccine development.
Gronvall concludes:
What happens next? There will be future virus spillovers, and this process will be accelerated by climate change. With this will come additional opportunities to learn the necessity of creating a better buffer between animals and humans to limit the risk of disease. We are just at the beginning stages of understanding the complexity of viruses in the natural world, and further study will be critical for health and prosperity. U.S. national security experts may eventually need to become as familiar with the biology of pandemics as they are with the nuclear triad. But this won’t be possible as long as politics and rhetoric take precedence over reason and necessary research.
