ARGUMENT: INSIDER THREATThe Teixeira Disclosures and Systemic Problems in the U.S. Intelligence Community

U.S. airman Jack Teixeira appeared in court on Friday following his arrest by the FBI for the “alleged unauthorized removal, retention and transmission of classified national defense information.” His arrest follows a week of speculation about leaked U.S. intelligence documents, which, among other things, revealed classified information on the war in Ukraine, including troop movements, battle plans, lethal aid shipments, and Russian leadership dynamics.

Brianna Rosen writes in Just Security that the unauthorized disclosure points to broader systemic failures in the safeguarding of U.S. intelligence information, as well as new insider threats which pose thorny legal and policy challenges. “As intelligence and law enforcement leaders assess the damage, Congress should be asking tough questions to hold the executive branch accountable and prevent future leaks,” she writes, adding:

The incident differs from previous high-profile leaks, such as Edward Snowden’s revelations or Chelsea Manning’s disclosures. Unlike those cases, Teixeira was apparently not a self-styled whistleblower. There is also no public indication that he was a foreign agent, although the intelligence he leaked eventually ended up in pro-Russian Telegram channels and much of it was a boost for Moscow.

According to Bellingcat and New York Times investigations, the intelligence documents initially were posted on the online gaming platform Discord before migrating elsewhere to Internet sites such as YouTube, image board 4Chan, Telegram, and Twitter. Teixeira shared photos of the intelligence documents in a private chatroom called Thug Shaker Central – a small group of mostly young men who bonded online during the pandemic over guns and racist memes – reportedly to “inform” his “friends” about government overreach.

This type of insider threat is likely to be more pervasive, and in some significant ways more dangerous, than traditional espionage. Counterintelligence measures, though imperfect, are in place to prevent foreign intelligence agencies from recruiting U.S. officials, such as through tracking the finances, travel, and foreign contacts of U.S. government employees. But it is far more challenging to root out potential insider threats with no external connections, where none of these drivers or red flags may be present.

Rosen notes that while the Pentagon and law enforcement agencies recently have taken steps to counter extremism in their ranks – particularly in the wake of the January 6th attacks on the U.S. Capitol – domestic extremism within the U.S. Intelligence Community remains a growing and under-appreciated threat. 

This insider threat is compounded by risks emanating from disinformation campaigns. That’s true for both inputs and outputs. In terms of inputs, anti-government extremist conspiracy theories may motivate more insiders to think they have a righteous cause. In terms of outputs, allegations that some aspects of the leaked intelligence documents were deliberately altered, for example, raises the prospect of more sophisticated disinformation operations based on partially correct intelligence.

Rosen writes that the incident highlights a longstanding problem with how to monitor online gaming platforms, a less obvious medium for sharing intelligence which poses significant legal and policy challenges. Rosen writes that both Congress and senior administration officials should demand answers to the following questions:

1. Why did it take at least a month for the unauthorized disclosure to come to the attention of U.S. authorities?

2. How does the administration plan to increase surveillance of online gaming platforms and chatrooms? What financial, personnel, and other resources are needed to do so?

3. How will the administration balance surveillance of online gaming platforms with privacy concerns? What legal protections and procedures will be put in place to safeguard individual privacy rights?

4. Should law enforcement authorities be allowed to access, read, and store communications from U.S. citizens to foreign members of private group chats?

5. What is the procedure for conducting background checks of intelligence branches of the Air National Guard and are background checks equally rigorous for all U.S. Intelligence Community agencies? What is the procedure for conducting continuing checks after individuals have joined the government, and what improvements can be adopted to that system?

6. Why was Teixeira able to obtain a security clearance and pass required background checks despite holding anti-government and discriminatory views? Did he undergo a psychological evaluation as part of routine background checks?

7. How did Teixeira gain access to sensitive intelligence on Ukraine and other national security issues outside the scope of his normal duties? Did he have access to raw reporting in addition to finished intelligence products?

8. Did Teixeira receive emails with intelligence roundups? How wide is the distribution list for such roundups?

9. How was Teixeira able to take intelligence documents home?

10. What steps does the administration plan to take to root out extremism within U.S. intelligence agencies and prevent similar disclosures in the future?