U.S. Is Losing Ground to China in Southeast Asia | Six Lessons from Ukraine for Japanese Defense Planners | Myanmar on the Frontline of a New Cold War, and more

The U.S. Is Losing Ground to China in Southeast Asia (Joshua Kurlantzick, World Polituics Review)
Over the past five years, Beijing has embarked on a much more assertive military and diplomatic approach in Southeast Asia, as in many other parts of the world. It has stepped up its militarization of the South China Sea and its use of fishing vessels and troops to drive off fishing boats from Southeast Asian states operating in regional waters. It has increasingly menaced Taiwan, and its diplomats have adopted an aggressive, sometimes bullying “wolf warrior” style of diplomacy in many other parts of the world in recent years. It also has cracked down hard on civil liberties in Hong Kong and at home, and, during its zero COVID era, sometimes appeared to have lost control of aspects of its own populace. 
Yet despite all these problems, China’s influence in Southeast Asia, its nearest neighborhood and one of the most vital areas for contestation between Beijing and the United States and its partners, has soared in recent years. China’s rising influence has come largely at the expense of the United States, which is seeing its regional influence ebb at great speed.  

U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era  (Susan M. Gordon, Michael G. Mullen, and David Sacks, CFR)
U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.
A conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) over Taiwan is becoming increasingly imaginable, a result of China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness, the emergence and coalescence of a separate Taiwanese identity, and evolving U.S. calculations about its interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence fails and a war erupts, the result would be calamitous for Taiwan, China, the United States, and the world, resulting in thousands of casualties on all sides and a profound global economic depression.
Reinforcing deterrence without provoking the conflict that it seeks to avoid is no small task. Indeed, some argue that, given the risk, the United States should lessen its support for Taiwan. Such a course, however, fails to adequately reckon with what the world would look like the day after a successful Chinese assault: markedly less safe, less free, and less prosperous. Beyond deterring Chinese aggression, the United States also has an interest in enhancing its unofficial relationship with a top-ten trading partner, a fellow democracy, and a like-minded force on global issues.

In a Cross-Strait Scenario, Taiwan’s Semiconductors are Irrelevant  (Michael Turton, National Interest)
In recent months, the flagship Taiwanese tech firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), has been a focus of discussions about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. For instance, Nikkei published a piece by Jared M. McKinney, a professor at the U.S. Air Force War College. McKinney argues that Taiwan should destroy TSMC’s world-leading chip foundries to prevent them from falling into PRC hands.
After China gets its hands on the advanced extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) machines, McKinney contends, it could then proceed to develop its own alternative chip-making capacity; “Once it got through short-term disruptions, China could emerge as a semiconductor superpower that is essentially self-reliant.” It follows that threatening to destroy the machines would help deter an invasion, and “It is in Taiwan’s interest to make clear that China will not gain access to TSMC’s EUV machines and semiconductor foundries if it invades.”
However, the truth is simple: TSMC is irrelevant.
Long before TSMC emerged as a semiconductor colossus, Chinese leaders claimed Taiwan as a sovereign territory of the People’s Republic. The claim exists irrespective of Taiwan’s economic prowess. Although McKinney does not argue the TSMC drives the PRC’s annexation dreams, other commentators like Marc Kennis have argued this explicitly. If TSMC disappeared tomorrow, Beijing would go right on pretending Taiwan has always been part of China.

Micronesia as Headline Fodder in the U.S.–China Contest  (Leland Bettis and Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, The Strategist)
In the context of world events, an announcement that US President Joe Biden would sign agreements with Pacific island nations may not seem to be headline news. However, when those agreements are framed as a counter to China, many pay attention. Events in the Pacific islands region these days are analyzed for how they contribute to great-power politics. For example, the US official announcing Biden’s plans later said that Washington ‘was playing … a little bit of catch-up’ in the diplomatic contest with Beijing.
The media headlines are closely following the ‘pushing back against China’ storyline. Observers characterized Biden’s planned trip to Papua New Guinea to sign agreements with Prime Minister James Marape and renew aspects of the Compacts of Free Association with Micronesian states as ‘nice work from the White House as it surrounds China’s upstart dictatorship in the Solomons’. But while the PNG security agreements had some novel aspects, the Micronesian compacts got lumped in with them, even though the security portions of the compacts were not the direct subject of negotiation.
Praising the signing of ‘security pacts’ with Micronesia is a celebration of deeds already done. There was really nothing new. What does it say about the media’s narrative on US–China competition when old news is news?

Taiwan on Alert for Chinese-Funded Election Interference  (Yimou Lee, Reuters)
Taiwan’s government says China will try to interfere in key elections in January by illicitly funding Beijing-friendly candidates using communications apps or group tours, according to three internal security reports reviewed by Reuters.
President Tsai Ing-wen’s government has repeatedly warned of China’s attempts to influence public opinion on the democratically governed island, which Beijing claims as its own territory despite Taipei’s strong objections.
Although senior Taiwan officials, including the head of the National Security Council, Wellington Koo, have this year warned that China could try to sway the presidential and legislative elections with influence campaigns including misinformation, details of how Taiwan thinks China may use illicit funding have not previously been reported.

Six Lessons from Ukraine for Japanese Defense Planners  (Jeffery W. Hornung, War on the Rocks)
Japanese leaders have already begun internalizing key lessons from Ukraine. As shown in a triad of strategic documents released last December, Tokyo is ramping up spending on munition stocks, maintenance, and base hardening and readiness, as well as making new investments across all domains. But despite this, Japanese officials are silent on whether they are preparing for a short conflict or a long one. This matters because, as the Ukrainian war demonstrates, a protracted struggle could require different plans from the ones Japan is possibly making.
Any conflict involving China and the United States is unlikely to be a short one. For Japan to participate effectively in any East China Sea conflict — even in its own defense — Japanese forces should take six key lessons from the current fight in Ukraine: prepare for a protracted conflict; ensure an adequate logistics posture; be ready for active combat; assist the broader fight; use unmanned capabilities; and sustain the will to fight. Addressing these issues can help Japan — and the alliance — become better prepared to rapidly respond in support of U.S. operational timelines.

Is Myanmar the Frontline of a New Cold War?  (Myo Hein and Lucas Myers, Foreign Affairs)
Ever since the Burmese military seized power in a coup in early 2021, the country has been caught in a deadly tailspin. What began as peaceful mass protest against the junta flared into armed resistance, with much of the country descending into renewed civil war. The conflict has since turned into a protracted insurgency, with newer pro-democracy forces fighting alongside ethnic armed groups that have battled central authorities for decades. Amid growing signs of a strategic stalemate, both the junta and the resistance appear determined to fight on.