Nuclear Electricity Supply Would Be Less Vulnerable to Attack Than Renewables

Now, penetration of the containment building is likely to knock out the station out regardless of damage to the reactor, because cooling systems, heat exchangers or condensers will likely be damaged. But a catastrophic release of radiation is less likely. And in fact the more vulnerable part of the station is the adjacent turbine hall. But it would be no more vulnerable than firming installations—gas or hydro power stations or large lithium batteries.

Then there’s the question of recuperability—how quickly installations can be brought back on line after damage. In the nuclear-generation scenario, reactor damage would be catastrophic and take months to years to recuperate. But, as noted above, it would be improbable, and the more likely problem would be damage to ancillary systems, turbines or the station’s transformers. They could be fixed or replaced in about as much time as the turbines or transformers of firming installations could be, and possibly faster than an array of large lithium batteries. Note that replacing ancillary systems, turbines and transformers would not be far from current Australian manufacturing capabilities.

So, in both nuclear-generation and renewable-generation scenarios there is risk in concentrated sources of electricity, but on balance the nuclear set-up is not appreciably worse and may even be better.

Regardless of the means of generation, the main vulnerability is in the distribution network. While renewable generation assets are numerous, they are also functionally useless in isolation: the system works only if networked together so that when the sun isn’t shining in Queensland, for example, the South Australian wind can take up the slack.

There are about 305 substations across the National Electricity Market, and destruction or disablement of only the four main interconnector transmission lines is likely sufficient to splinter the system. Destruction of only eight substations is likely to isolate the main generating regions from the capital cities, regardless of how much renewable capacity there is.

Substations, being compact and not particularly robust, are also much more vulnerable to attack. Vulnerability will rise in the renewable-generation scenario. Because renewables capacity is often built far from demand, the distribution grid grows, increasing the area to be protected, and relying more on internet enabled control systems. This increases vulnerability to additional attack vectors, including cyber and sabotage. The protection against this may be far more draining on limited national capabilities.

The distribution network would be relatively recuperable, because replacing a transformer is a simpler task than repairing a turbine or pressure vessel. US experience tells us that the job typically takes eight to 35 days. But the sheer ease of re-attack and quantity of targets may exhaust our stock of repair or replacement components quickly. Similarly, trying to protect each node with surface-to-air systems would exhaust our available forces.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that targeting nuclear power stations has been deliberately avoided by both sides in the Ukraine war, and it is beyond dispute that attacks on nuclear facilities in any conflict would be regarded as escalatory. While non-binding common practice should not be used as a mitigation in its own right, it adds a degree of complication to the enemy assessment.

Nuclear power stations may actually be the safest, and most defendable part of the electrical system.

Graham Cummings is an artillery officer in the Australian Army. This articleis published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).