AI Enters the Critical Mineral Race | China is Winning the Global South, and more

AI Enters the Critical Mineral Race  (Christina Lu, Foreign Policy)
As AI-mania sweeps the world, the technology has already been used to do everything from decoding ancient literary epics and writing soulless breakup texts to generating eerily realistic images of people—though often with an extra finger or two.
Now, some companies and U.S. agencies are betting that AI can also aid in the United States’ scramble for the critical minerals that are essential to powering the green technologies at the center of the energy transition.
The world’s electric vehicle batteries, wind turbines, and advanced weapons systems have all been built with vast quantities of raw materials: cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, and powerful rare-earth elements. Yet the United States has for decades been out of the critical minerals game as a result of a raft of environmental, economic, health, and political concerns—pushing Washington to become increasingly reliant on supply chains dominated by China.
The global energy transition and energy security concerns have reignited U.S. efforts to slash this dependence and secure new supply chains. Beyond the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act, which included massive subsidies aimed at jump-starting a domestic mining industry, U.S. lawmakers have introduced legislation to try to boost the U.S. mining workforce and develop a comprehensive critical mineral strategy.
As this momentum builds, companies are increasingly looking into how AI can potentially advance Washington’s critical mineral ambitions, particularly when it comes to mineral exploration. 

The Philippines Is Washington’s New Front Line Against China  (Nick Aspinwall, Foreign Policy)
When the U.S. and Philippine militaries concluded their largest-ever joint military exercises on May 8, they cemented a surprisingly robust security alliance that is crucial to containing China—both in the South China Sea and beyond.
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has re-embraced its historic security ties with the United States. Washington has been happy to increase arms transfers and make new infrastructure promises that bring the Philippine government in Manila closer to Washington and its regional allies, including Tokyo. It’s a stark contrast with Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, who favored closer ties with Beijing and in 2020 temporarily withdrew the Philippines from an agreement allowing U.S. forces to visit and train in the country.
China has responded to Marcos Jr.’s turn toward the United States by firing water cannons at and ramming Philippine vessels multiple times in the South China Sea, where Beijing has competing territorial claims with several countries including the Philippines. In June, a Philippine navy sailor on a resupply mission to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal lost his thumb in a confrontation with armed members of the Chinese Coast Guard. It’s the most consistent pressure Beijing has applied since an international court of arbitration ruled in favor of Manila’s maritime claims in 2016.
So far, Washington has been eager to help Manila, with whom it’s had a mutual defense treaty since the Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946. Filipinos overwhelmingly opposed the turn toward China made by the otherwise popular Duterte administration and mostly view the United States as a valued partner in maintaining the country’s territorial sovereignty.
There have been hints towards wider potential alliances. This year’s Balikatan, or “shoulder-to-shoulder,” joint military exercises took place primarily off the Philippine coasts and in maritime areas facing China, from the southern tip of Palawan, a western island, to the remote northern islands of Batanes province, which lie fewer than 125 miles from Taiwan.

China is Winning the Global South  (Daniel Runde, National Interest)
reat Power Competition, sometimes called the Second Cold War, is unfolding on a global scale. The United States is not competing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, nor is the United States competing with Vladimir Putin’s system in Russia. Today, we are competing along a possible “kinetic front” in East Asia (Taiwan and the Nine Dash Line), Ukraine, and Israel. Additionally, there is arguably a “second front” in the realm of technology, encompassing the battle over artificial intelligence, telecommunications, subsea cables, and microchips. Perhaps the most underappreciated yet critical front, a “third front” in this Great Power Competition, is the “Global South,” or the developing world. During the First Cold War, the developing world was a major front, so it is not surprising that the Global South is again a significant theater or—in a scenario where the United States does not end up in a full Great Power War—is the central theater of competition over the next forty years.
The Global South is a notion that comprises many regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Pacific Island States, South Asia, Central Asia, some post-Soviet countries, and the Middle East. Historically referred to as the “Third World,” this term is now widely considered to be outdated or even offensive. The “Global South” is a term recently popularized by the CCP—which has spent decades attempting to ingratiate itself within this theater—although the term’s appropriateness is debated. Alternative terms such as the “developing world,” “G-77,” or “new non-aligned countries” have been suggested, though none have proven to be completely satisfactory.
While the United States and allied national security community have focused extensively on the first two fronts—potential military conflicts and technological competition—the third front in the Global South remains critical yet underappreciated. This region represents some of the world’s leading sources of strategic materials, consumer markets, potential allies—as well as current or potential partners in security burden-sharing. China has been actively making inroads in the Global South for well over twenty years, with relationships dating back more than fifty years—some based on Chinese manipulation of anti-colonial sentiments. Russia, in some cases, has relations going back much further, with some lingering, popular appreciation for the Soviet Union’s support during these nations’ anti-colonial struggles.
China views the Global South as a pivotal market and partner in challenging the liberal world order. By leveraging the concerns of the Global South about the current international system, China aims to undermine the influence of the United States. The Chinese leadership, often accusing the United States of initiating a “new cold war,” advocates for the “democratization of international relations.” This narrative is part of China’s broader strategy to reshape the global order around its own interests rather than U.S. ones. Beijing’s asymmetric response emphasizes “non-alignment” and a commitment to helping countries protect their sovereignty, avoiding alignment with major power blocs or external dictates. This approach is presented as a counter to U.S. efforts to restore the appeal of liberal democracy, which China portrays as an outdated “cold war mentality” that threatens Chinese ambitions, both on a regional and global scale.

Technology Controls to Contain China’s Quantum Ambitions Are Here  (Elias X. Huber, Lawfare)
In a recently announced rule effective May 9, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 37 Chinese entities to the Entity List, restricting them from acquiring items listed under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with license review policy “Presumption of denial.” Twenty-two of the entities listed were added “for their participation in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) quantum technology advancements.” These include leading Chinese institutes, such as the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) or the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Physics, whose education and research activities go far beyond quantum technology—marking a significant escalation of prior controls.
The U.S. government regards quantum technologies, encompassing applications in computing, sensing and communication leveraging the laws of quantum mechanics, as a potentially disruptive emerging technology. In terms of technical readiness, established supply chains, and the range of known applications, quantum technologies are in a far earlier stage than semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI), which have also been targets of significant export controls in recent years.
While quantum technology controls aimed at China are a reality today, broad export controls aimed at retaining U.S. technological leadership in quantum will likely not be effective beyond a decade. This is due to the early stage of the technology, the international spread of talent and hardware developments, as well as the limits of U.S. technological leadership today. Other more effective forms of technology control such as limiting interactions and the movement of (human) capital may be undesirable: They cut both ways, limiting access to a growing Chinese research environment already frequently described as opaque, and pose risks to responsible multilateral governance.
Beyond restrictions, Western policymakers should explore other means of reducing “access asymmetries,” referring to an unequal flow of knowledge to China. Historically, China has learned much from the West about “best practices” for developing modern science and technology. However, this learning process has been increasingly disrupted by the restrictions described above at a time when—in areas such as quantum technologies—it could finally go both ways. Despite the challenge of growing geopolitical rifts between China and the West, formats to retain access and allow some participation in China’s technological development could alternatively serve to reduce access asymmetries.  Similar thinking can also inform import screening, outbound investment controls, hiring guidelines, or policies on student exchanges.