IRAN’S NUKESIran Increases Enrichment Activities to Dangerous Levels: IAEA
The most recent IAEA report sounded an alarm about a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant. No longer constrained by the 2015 nuclear deal, from which the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew in 2018, Iran can now decide to produce10-15 kg of weapon grade uranium (WGU) per month, an annual rate of 120 to 130 kg WGU per year, enough for about five nuclear weapons. Iran could supplement this at any point by using its existing stock of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU).
On December 6, 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released an update on its verification and monitoring activities in Iran. The two-page report sounded an alarm about a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant. On December 5, Iran began feeding 20 percent enriched uranium in two interconnected IR-6 cascades previously fed with up to 5 percent low enriched uranium, to make far more 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU), along with enriching in more cascades at Fordow.
Findings
· Iran is instituting a capacity to make weapon grade uranium (WGU), under the guise of making 60 percent HEU, at the Fordow underground enrichment plant. It can now start producing WGU quickly without even using its existing stocks of 60 percent HEU.
· The IAEA reports that Iran is setting up a three step, interconnected enrichment process at Fordow, going from natural uranium up to 5 percent enriched uranium in up to 8 IR-6 cascades, from 5 to 20 percent in six current IR-1 cascades, and 20 to 60 percent in two interconnected IR-6 cascades. This three-step process allows the near continuous, sequential enrichment of natural uranium to 60 percent HEU. This process can be easily modified to produce WGU.
· With this new arrangement, Iran could multiply its average 60 percent HEU production rate at Fordow by four to six times. The IAEA reports Iran could make “more than 34 kg” per month. This is consistent with an ideal cascade calculation, which results in an estimate of about 35 kg of 60 percent HEU (Uranium mass) on average per month. A more conservative approach leads to the assessment that Iran could produce about 25 kg (Uranium mass) on average per month, still an alarming increase.
· If it decided to make weapon-grade uranium in the third step of the two interconnected IR-6 cascades instead, starting with 20 percent enriched uranium feed, Iran could produce about 15 kg WGU per month, assuming an ideal cascade calculation as above, or a few kilograms less, about 10-11 kg WGU per month, in a more conservative calculation. The latter gives an annual rate of 120 to 130 kg WGU per year, enough for about five nuclear weapons.
