Why a U.S. Minerals Deal with Ukraine Won’t Deter Russian Aggression
Second, the overall US commitment to protect American assets abroad is uncertain. The US has, since the end of the cold war, been selective about when and how it uses military force to protect overseas assets.
Since 1991, the US military has intervened to protect American property in only four documented instances: Haiti in 2004, Lebanon in 2006, Egypt in 2011 and Yemen in 2012. These cases involved embassies and other smaller properties during periods of civil unrest, rather than defending economic interests.
Recent presidents, including Trump, have been reluctant to use force to protect threatened American investments. US agribusiness giant Cargill, for example, had to close its operations in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region following Russia’s invasion in 2014.
Building State Capacity
That said, economic relations with America can indeed bolster a partner state’s security. But my own research shows that this is largely through indirect channels, rather than the threat of military intervention.
For example, US government departments, such as the US patent and trademark office, provide comprehensive training to partner states. Programs involve training judges, police officers, prosecutors and policymakers to enforce intellectual property protections, administer land registries, combat counterfeiting and develop legal frameworks that protect investments.
This capacity building not only helps American investors in these countries, but also improves the partner state’s overall capacity. More effective and capable bureaucracies are better able to manage and finance their military capabilities.
Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the US launched the agriculture and rural development support program. The initiative aimed to develop Ukraine’s institutional capacity for managing property rights and attracting diverse investments.
The US Treasury brought in loan advisory firm First Financial Network to help Ukraine navigate its financial crisis after the invasion, while simultaneously building frameworks for foreign investment.
By 2020, this partnership facilitated US investment firm Allrise Capital’s purchase of Odessa’s Chornomorets football stadium. This deal was described by John Morris, the president of First Financial Network, as demonstrating Ukraine’s ability “to sell assets to the international community”.
These efforts did not deter Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. But they helped the Ukrainian government implement several administrative reforms in the years leading up to the invasion, including more efficient tax collection and professionalization of civil servants. The government was better prepared for war than it would otherwise have been.
If the US wants to enhance Ukraine’s security through economic means, the Trump administration would need to make two drastic changes.
First, it would need to reinstate programs that promote American investment abroad. After assuming office, Trump froze and began dismantling the United States Agency for International Development (USAid). The agency’s capacity-building efforts have security consequences.
Second, for the US to have both an economic and security impact, Trump needs to reassure America’s allies. Assurances are not Trump’s specialty. On February 26, for example, Trump declined to say whether the US would defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China.
Research suggests that investments follow alliances. But markets do not care about agreements alone. They respond to other signals too, like explicit statements of support. These statements of support also help to reassure allies and deter rivals.
Unless Trump changes how he operates on the international stage, the economics of the mineral deal will not help Ukraine’s security situation.
Patrick E. Shea is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Global Governance, University of Glasgow. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
