How to Help the U.S. Navy as It Helps Us: Build a Joint Submarine Facility
The Joint Defense Facility Henderson would be a maintenance, not building, yard for the US Navy. It would perform much deeper work than the support that HMAS Stirling will provide for SRF-W deployments.
It would become the US Navy’s fifth naval shipyard, adding to those in Maine, Virginia, Washington State and Hawaii. From Australia’s perspective, we have to build the shipyard at Henderson for our own purposes, anyway. Offering to operate it as a joint facility would ensure continuous workflow (as the facility would be the site for eventually maintaining 12 or more Australian and US submarines). This would assist in the recruitment and retention of what will need to be a long-term skilled workforce.
Becoming a trusted partner in an integrated allied submarine maintenance system would be an invaluable alliance contribution by Australia. The US Navy has a severe submarine maintenance backlog, currently forecast to last for decades. This backlog reduces the number of US submarines that can be put to sea. At the end of 2023, of a US Navy combat force of 48 attack submarines, 16 were in maintenance—that is, 33 percent. The US Navy is seeking to reduce that ratio to 20 percent; based on current fleet size, that would make six more submarines available to go to sea. Having access to an additional shipyard in Australia would assist the US Navy in achieving this maintenance goal. The US would have to pay for only labor and material costs for maintaining its own boats, taking advantage of Australia’s capital investment in Henderson for free.
To support the president’s certification, Australia could specially commit to ensuring access to Henderson such that the US Navy could reduce its maintenance backlog by at least three submarines between 2032 and 2038—which is when Australia is due to receive three Virginia-class boats (two refurbished and one new). Then the US would not be reducing its submarine force in honoring its AUKUS commitment. Beyond 2038, Australia could commit to further assisting the US to increase submarine availability. Over the very long term, by 2054 when the US and Australia would be operating a combined force of 74 attack submarines (66 in the US Navy and eight in the Royal Australian Navy), the two nations would between them have five naval shipyards and 22 drydocks for submarine maintenance, including Henderson.
To achieve this goal, Defense would need to cut through regulatory and construction obstacles, ideally aiming to have two operating drydocks ready in the Henderson shipyard by 2032 (perhaps using nuclear-certified floating docks at first, as Britain is seeking to do). Australia should seek to lock in such a treaty, thereby assuring itself of access to Virginia-class boats from 2032, by negotiating a deal with the Trump administration over the next 12 to 18 months.
If Australia does this, and assists the US to boost Virginia production, drives the development and production of the SSN-AUKUS submarine with Britain, extends the life of the Collins–class fleet, builds a proposed East Coast submarine base and acquires uncrewed underwater combat vessels at scale (in the thousands of units), it will become an undersea naval superpower. However, this will require political and bureaucratic leadership and organizational drive that is rarely seen outside of wartime.
Michael Pezzullo is a former deputy secretary of defense and was secretary of home affairs until November 2023. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
