What Damage Did the U.S. Do to Iran’s Nuclear Program? Why It’s So Hard to Know
Other sources may prove useful as well. Reporting from human intelligence assets – spies or unwitting informers with firsthand or secondhand knowledge – may provide information on internal Iranian assessments. These may be particularly valuable because Iranian officials presumably know how much equipment was removed in advance, as well as the location of previously enriched uranium.
The same is true for signals intelligence, which intercepts and interprets communications. Ideally, battle damage assessment will become more comprehensive and accurate as these sources of intelligence are integrated into a single assessment.
Pervasive Uncertainty
But even in that case, it will still be difficult to estimate the broader effects on Iran’s nuclear program. Measuring the immediate physical effects on Fordo and other nuclear sites is a kind of puzzle, or a problem that can be solved with sufficient evidence. Estimating the long-term effects on Iranian policy is a mystery, or a problem that cannot be solved even with abundant information on hand. It’s impossible to know how Iran’s leaders will adapt over time to their changing circumstances. They themselves cannot know either; perceptions of the future are inherently uncertain.
Regarding the puzzle over Fordo, Trump seems to believe that the sheer volume of explosives dropped on the site must have done the job. As White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt put it: “Everyone knows what happens when you drop 14 30,000-pound bombs perfectly on their targets: total obliteration.”
But the fact that Fordo is buried in the side of a mountain is a reason to doubt this commonsense conclusion. In addition, Iran may have moved enriched uranium and specialized equipment from the site in advance, limiting the effects on its nuclear program.
Trump’s instincts might be right. Or the skeptics might be right. Both make plausible claims. Analysts will need more intelligence from more sources to make a confident judgment about the effects on Fordo and on Iran’s broader nuclear efforts. Even then, it is likely that they will disagree on the effects, because this requires making predictions.
Politicized Intelligence
In a perfect world, policymakers and intelligence officials would wrestle with dueling assessments in good faith. Such a process would take place outside the political fray, giving both sides the opportunity to offer criticism without being accused of political mischief. In this idealized scenario, policymakers could use reasonable intelligence conclusions to inform their decision-making process. After all, there are a lot of decisions about Middle Eastern security left to be made.
But we are not in a perfect world, and hopes for a good faith debate seem hopelessly naïve. Already the battle lines are being drawn. Congressional Democrats are suspicious that the administration is being disingenuous about Iran. The White House, for its part, is going on the offensive. “The leaking of this alleged assessment is a clear attempt to demean President Trump,” Leavitt declared in a written statement, “and discredit the brave fighter pilots who conducted a perfectly executed mission.”
Relations between policymakers and their intelligence advisers are often contentious, and U.S. presidents have a long history of clashing with spy chiefs. But intelligence-policy relations today are in a particularly dismal state. Trump bears the most responsibility, given his repeated disparagement of intelligence officials. For example, he dismissed the congressional testimony on Iran from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard: “I don’t care what she said.”
The problem goes deeper than the president, however. Intelligence-policy relations in a democracy are difficult because of the persuasive power of secret information. Policymakers fear that intelligence officials who control secrets might use them to undermine the policymakers’ plans. Intelligence officials worry that the policymakers will bully them into giving politically convenient answers. Such fears led to intelligence-policy breakdowns over estimates of enemy strength in the Vietnam War and estimates of Soviet missile capabilities in the early years of detente.
This mutual suspicion has become progressively worse since the end of the Cold War, as secret intelligence has become increasingly public. Intelligence leaders have become recognizable public figures, and intelligence judgments on current issues are often quickly declassified. The public now expects to have access to intelligence findings, and this has helped turn intelligence into a political football.
What Lies Ahead
What does all this mean for intelligence on Iran? Trump might ignore assessments he dislikes, given his history with intelligence. But the acrimonious public dispute over the Fordo strike may lead the White House to pressure intelligence leaders to toe the line, especially if critics demand a public accounting of secret intelligence.
Such an outcome would benefit nobody. The public would not have a better sense of the questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear effort, the intelligence community would suffer a serious blow to its reputation, and the administration’s efforts to use intelligence in public might backfire, as was the case for the George W. Bush administration after the war in Iraq.
As with military campaigns, episodes of politicizing intelligence have lasting and sometimes unforeseen consequences.
Joshua Rovner is Associate Professor of International Relations, American University. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
