Negotiating with North Korea in the Shadow of Great Power Rivalry  (Choong-Koo Lee, War on the Rocks)
The United States and South Korea have converged on the idea of dialogue with North Korea. But can it work? Will it?
U.S. President Donald Trump has repeated his intention to meet North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, while Elbridge Colby, the current undersecretary of defense for policy, expressed support in December 2024 for focusing on “limiting the range of North Korean [intercontinental ballistic missiles].” During the recent U.S.-South Korean summit in late August, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung also asked Trump to play a role in making peace in the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to hold a future U.S.-North Korean summit. The United States and South Korea agreed to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea in a phased manner.
In response, Pyongyang has rejected the phased denuclearization proposal, insisting that an essential condition for negotiation with the United States is its acceptance of North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. After Trump and Lee announced their intention to negotiate with Kim, North Korea began building bargaining leverage by showcasing its modernized missile production capacity and advanced long-range missile technology. On Sept. 4, 2025, Kim also met General Secretary Xi Jinping of China to discuss strategic cooperation on international and regional issues, likely including Xi’s emphasis on peace and stability on the peninsula. These developments could indicate North Korea’s preparation to pursue nuclear arms reduction negotiation with the United States, based on China’s understanding and support. After his return from Beijing, Kim inspected the test of a solid-fuel engine for Hwasong-20, which has a longer range that its predecessors. By extending the range of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korea intends to press America to negotiate on its terms.

Can More British and French Nuclear Cooperation Help Deter Russia?  (Zsofia Wolford, James Black, and Paul van Hooft, War on the Rocks)
As Europe continues to come to terms with both the Russian threat amid the war in Ukraine as well as the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment to Europe, policymakers across the continent are urgently considering alternative deterrence arrangements. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly spoken of the “European dimension” to the French nuclear deterrent and his country’s willingness to open a conversation about extending a French nuclear umbrella to Europe’s non-nuclear states. In July 2025, France and the United Kingdom, Europe’s two nuclear powers, announced stronger nuclear coordination in the Northwood Declaration, Lancaster House 2.0, and the U.K.-France Leaders Declaration. While Britain and France have a long history of such cooperation, these announcements undoubtedly take things to a new level.
Yet, assessments of European nuclear deterrence are often inward-looking, focusing on French and British arsenal sizes and escalation options, and on reassuring European allies of French and British credibility. What adversaries think about European deterrence efforts is, however, underappreciated. As defense spending surges, European policymakers should assess whether Russia takes the French and British nuclear deterrents seriously and what capability investments make sense to deter adversaries.
In a recent RAND Europe study, we looked at the Russian military-analytical community’s publications on the French and British deterrents between 2010 and 2024. We discuss the findings of that study here and lay out the options facing European states to further strengthen their conventional and nuclear deterrence against Russia. These options could give Europeans political leverage through potential future arms control efforts. While much work remains to be done in this field, we offer insights that can help identify and address the deterrence gaps of NATO Europe toward Russia.