Growing rift among Israeli leaders about war's end-game

These are exceedingly lopsided ratios (the recitation of these figures should not be taken as a sign of callousness or detachment — we should not for even a minute forget the very real human suffering, and deep tragedy, these figures represent): Hamas suffers nearly 70 dead for every 1 death they inflict on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and 10 injuries for every injury their fighters inflict. The Palestinian civilian population suffers even more: Nearly 140 Palestinian civilians have died for every Israeli civilian who was killed, and about 100 Palestinian civilians are injured for every Israeli citizen injured.

Whatever we say about the Israeli tactics — and when a liberal, democratic state inflicts death and destruction on such a scale, its tactics should be a subject of searching examination — we should acknowledge the responsibility Hamas bears for the suffering of the Palestinian population (see Ben Frankel, “Gaza Civilians Suffer as a Result of Hamas’s Tactics — and Israel’s,” HS Daily Wire, 7 January 2009). It is usually the case that, in war, a nation uses its military to shield and defend the civilian population from the adversary’s attacks. Hamas does the opposite: It uses the Palestinian civilian population to shield Hamas fighters from Israel’s attacks. Thus, Hamas builds its military positions, arms caches, and command-and-control hubs inside and under residential buildings, hospitals, schools, mosques, and the like. It places rocket launchers right next to schools and hospitals. Many of its missiles are fired from residential areas.

Rift in Israel’s leadership
The campaign has now completed its two initial phases: The air assault, from 27 December to 3 January, and the insertion of ground forces from 3 January to this week. The very success of the campaign has led to a growing rift in Israel’s leadership. Defense Minister Barak, the commander of the IDF General Gabi Ashkenazi, Military Intelligence, and others associated with the defense establishment believe that Israel should try to reach an immediate cease-fire with Hamas, rather than expand its offensive against it in Gaza. Note that this is the second time Barak is pushing for an end to the fighting: ten days ago he tried to persuade the government to accept French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s offer of a 48-hour “humanitarian” cease-fire, hoping this would lead to an end to the campaign. The Israeli cabinet rebuffed Barak.

Haaretz’s Amos Harel writes that during meetings Monday and Tuesday of the IDF General Staff and of the heads of Israel’s other security branches, officials have said that Israel achieved several days ago all that it possibly could in Gaza. These defense officials expressed reservations about launching the third phase of Operation Cast Lead, preferring for it to remain a threat at this stage. Harel writes that these officials added that it would be better to end the offensive now, several days before the inauguration of new U.S. president Barack Obama.

Harel quotes a defense officialls to say that “Israel has proven… that it is no longer deterred from either launching such an operation, from a confrontation with Hamas, from deploying ground forces or from using its reservists.” Some of the defense officials argued that Israel can withdraw from Gaza even before Egypt deals with the issue of arms smuggling into Gaza from underground tunnels, as long as Israel threatens to respond swiftly and harshly to any Hamas truce violations.

Ehud Olmert, Israel’s outgoing prime minister, does not come from the Ben Gurion wing of the Zionist movement, but from the hawkish, nationalist, right-wing opposition to Ben Gurion. He has moderated his views on the outline of a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and offered ideas about Israeli concessions to the Palestinians that even more left-leaning politicians have not made.

Still, during the inconclusive 2006 Lebanon war against Hezbollah, Olmert was given to making sweeping statements about how Israel, using its military superiority, would create new order in the Middle East — statements one would expect from the old rather than the new, more sober Olmert. At the beginning of the Gaza campaign, it appeared that Olmert and others in Israel’s leadership have absorbed the two lessons of the Lebanon war:

Before you go to war, make sure you prepare well, know the enemy, and have a coherent battle plan
Set realistic goals for the war and be aware of the limitations of military power

The brilliant performance of the IDF to date — especially the quality of intelligence, the meticulous coordination of ground and air forces, the fusion of intelligence and operations — shows that that the first lesson has been learned (see “Gaza Campaign Highlights Strength, Limitations of Air Power,” 8 January 2009 HS Daily Wire, and “Israel Uses New ISR Systems, Ordnance,” 5 January 2009 HS Daily Wire).

The second lesson, though, appears to have been learned by Barak and the defense establishment, but not by Olmert. This is why Barak Ravid writes in Haaretz that officials close to Olmert blasted Barak for his — Barak’s — support of a week-long “humanitarian cease-fire” in the Gaza Strip. “The remarks constitute a lack of national responsibility,” the officials said. “Ministers speaking to the media about the conduct of the war touching on cease-fire initiatives are very grave.” Sources close to the prime minister added that, “Hamas sees the scenes and hears the voices — and these comments are a shot in the arm for Hamas and its leaders.”

To avoid having to decide on whether to expand the operation or agree to a cease-fire, Olmert today, Wednesday, did not convene the political-security cabinet to discuss whether the operations should go on. Ravid reports that he has also delayed a meeting with senior ministers in an effort to allow the military operations in Gaza to continue. Yesterday, Tuesday, Olmert did not meet with Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, both of whom support a cease-fire.

Power and restraint
It may well be the case that Olmert’s objections to the war’s end-game offered by Barak and Ashkenazi are tactical: Why let Hamas know in advance of negotiations that Israel has no plans of going deeper into Gaza? This argument is not convincing, though. Anyone who has followed Barak’s and Ashkenazi’s reluctance to initiate the Gaza campaign would know that these experienced soldiers want Israel to concentrate its attention and resources on the coming clash with Iran, a nation both view as posing an existential threat to Israel. Palestinian rockets may be a painful nuisance, but they are not an existential threat to Israel.

How to explain Olmert’s objection to the IDF’s proposals, then? The suspicion here is that weeks before he is to leave office, Olmert wants his legacy to include a more decisive and clear-cut victory over an adversary than the 2006 war offered, or that Barak and Ashkenazi advocate. The Israeli military — any military — though, cannot deliver the kind of victory over a group like Hamas that Olmert desires (other kinds of victory, however, are possible, and we will discuss them in a future analysis). If we may, we would urge Olmert to heed the advice of his mentor, Ariel Sharon. No one was more hawkish, more eager to resort to the use of force, than Sharon. Yet, one of Sharon’s oft-repeated mantras was: “Restraint is also power.” Olmert could do worse than use these words to guide him in his last days in office.

Ben Frankel is editor of HS Daily wire