Russia's cyber warfare strategies, II
example, bombing targets near Georgia’s vital Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline without actually striking it. By demonstrating dominance in the cyber and military domains, as well as the inability of Tbilisi’s Western allies to defend Georgia, Russian strategists might have aimed to underscore Moscow’s security dominance within the former Soviet space as well as deter the Georgian government, and perhaps the leaders of the other former Soviet republics, from taking future actions that could threaten Russian interests,” he writes.
Russian hackers were reportedly active again earlier this month when they attacked a Tbilisi computer user who posted Web entries critical of Moscow’s policies toward Georgia. From 6 to 7 August, the one-year anniversary of the Russian-Georgia War, his Facebook, Google Blogger, LiveJournal, Twitter, and YouTube accounts experienced a massive and simultaneous denial-of-service attack apparently aimed to prevent the Georgian from posting critical blog entries to mark the anniversary. The assault was so intense, involving networks of unsuspecting third-party computers that were instructed to flood the Web sites with traffic to deny access to others, that it caused the entire Twitter network to crash.
Weitz says that the Georgia campaign showed that Russia’s offensive information operations have improved considerably since the April-May 2007 conflict with Estonia. Russians will likely seek to strengthen their cyber campaign plans even further based on what they have learned. Cyber warriors in other countries such as China are likely to borrow techniques from the Russian campaign. Investigators have found evidence that Chinese hackers have conducted pre-attack mapping of U.S. critical infrastructure such as commercial power networks and, most disturbingly, have already deployed software programs that they could employ to disrupt the networks.
The report concludes with three insightful recommendations. First, an international organization should be established to monitor the risks of cyber wars and provide early warning before attacks occur, allowing potential victims to prepare their defenses better. Second, the report calls for a global cyber response force that can rapidly assist countries under attack. Finally, states need to conduct more frequent cyber response exercises involving key public and private sector institutions with at least some foreign participation.
Weitz concludes:
Meanwhile, the United States and other potential targets have been given yet another warning about the need to bolster their cyber defenses. The European Union finally convened its first ministerial meeting devoted to cyber security of critical infrastructures in late April of this year, while the U.S. military only authorized the establishment of a dedicated cyber command in June. The new CYBERCOM is not expected to become fully operational until at least a year from now. The White House continues to experience difficulties in establishing an effective policy for coordinating the diverse federal, state, and private sector computer networks associated with America’s critical national infrastructures. One lesson of the Georgia War is that U.S. and NATO defenders need to accelerate their preparedness efforts.
