What went though the mind of the suicide bomber Salman Abedi just before he blew himself up in Manchester this week, killing twenty-two people? We often dismiss terrorists as non-humans, monsters, at first. But when we learn that they were seemingly normal individuals with families and jobs, it’s hard not to wonder about how their minds really work. The search for a terrorist “personality” or “mindset” dominated psychological research in the 1970s and 1980s and remains a significant area for research today. The idea behind such research is obvious – it’s to identify stable, predictive traits or “markers” of terrorist personalities. If we could do that, we may be able to predict who will become a terrorist – and perhaps prevent it. This type of research should be viewed with extreme caution because it involves many variables over which there is no consensus among experts – but we could agree that the more we find out about terrorists’ quest for significance, the better we can understand the identity and social issues that are fundamental to radicalization. So there’s every reason to be optimistic that psychology can be a powerful tool in the fight against terrorism.

The Manchester attack illustrates how Western society is locked in an arms race with an ever adapting group of terrorists who keep changing their tactics and targets. Winning the battle depends on a number of complex factors and the acceptance that on the morning of 23 June Britain woke up to a new reality. We need to do more to consider the role of intelligence. Often the first person to know or suspect something about someone moving towards, or involved in, acts of terrorism will be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders. Their willingness to come forward and share knowledge, suspicions and concerns with authorities is critical because they offer a first line of defense. We are currently finding out more about the barriers and challenges people face in sharing information or cooperating with authorities, as well as what motivates them to surmount these challenges. This would tell us why those with concerns can fail to engage fully with government reporting campaigns. At the moment this is a critical blind spot in current counter-terrorism thinking and strategy.

Recent reports suggest that terrorists can now create bombs so thin that they cannot be detected by the current X-ray screening that our carry-on bags undergo. In an effort to protect against such threats, the U.S is considering banning laptops and other large electronic devices in the passenger cabins of airplanes flying between Europe and the United States. This would extend a ban already in place on flights from eight Middle Eastern countries. It is tempting to think that any level of cost and inconvenience is sensible if it reduces the risk of an attack even a little. But risks, inherent in flying and even driving, can never be avoided entirely. So when weighing policies that are designed to make us safer, it is important to consider both their costs and potential effectiveness. Unfortunately, whether the benefits justify the costs is too often not the yardstick used by officials determining whether to pursue these types of policies. Instead, it is more likely that political considerations motivate the adoption of restrictive policies, which in the end actually do little to protect citizens’ security.

The House Homeland Security Committee has released its April 2017 Terror Threat Snapshot, which details terrorism events and trends in April 2017. The snapshot is a monthly committee assessment of the threat America, the West, and the world face from ISIS and other Islamist terrorists. The document is produced by the Majority Staff of the committee. It is based on information culled from open source materials, including media reports, publicly available government statements, and nongovernmental assessments.

The latest edition of ISIS’s magazine offers alarming new terror tactics for jihadis and is threaded with a strong anti-Christian focus. The new Rumiyah justifies attacks against Christians and encourages ISIS supporters to get hold of guns where possible and lure victims for attacks via online ads. Another section in the magazine, titled “Just Terror Tactics,”, serves as a “start-up guide” for lone wolf attackers, presenting a novel use for the internet and promotes several tactics.

The Western Galilee Hospital, which is located in Nahariya on Israel’s northern Mediterranean coast, is situated just a few kilometers away from the Lebanese border, and has become a sanctuary for victims of Syria’s brutal civil war.According to Israeli officials, the country has so far quietly taken in more than 3,000 Syrians.The medical care provided is free of charge and hospitals do not discriminate on grounds of politics and religion when it comes to admittance.Aside from the humanitarian aspect to saving those wounded in the war, cooperation with rebel groups near Israel’s border also affords Israel a measure of protection.

Abdul Hasib, ISIS’s leader in Afghanistan, was killed by U.S. Special Forces in the eastern province of Nangarhar. American and Afghan officials said that the operation, in which Afghani forces also participated, was conducted last month. Hasib, who last year replaced Hafiz Saeed Khan – who had been killed in a U.S. drone strike – was behind several high-profile attacks, which included an 8 March attack on the main military hospital in Kabul.

Thousands of youths have been recruited by terrorist groups from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia and America. Between 2011 and 2016 the number of “foreign fighters” rose to more than 42,000 – among them 5000 Westerners and close to 7000 North Africans. They had travelled to the Middle East to join jihadist organizations such as the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) and the Syrian Fateh al-Sham Front (ex-Al-Nusra), a former al Qaeda affiliate. By early 2016, almost a third of these foreign fighters had returned to their countries of origin. Now that IS is suffering serious military setbacks, the flow of foreign fighters seems to have dwindled. More returnees can be expected to follow in the near future. How should governments manage these returnees? What the available evidence suggests is that governments must respond realistically to a complex problem. And they need to accept that opting for the reintegration of (former) terrorists to minimize the possibilities of future violence is not adopting a soft approach. Realistically, it’s the only approach.

New evidence supports the conclusion that Syrian government forces have used nerve agents on at least four occasions in recent months: on 4 April 2017, in a chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun that killed at least ninety-two people, and on three other occasions in December 2016 and March 2017, Human Rights Watch said in a report released yesterday. These attacks are part of a broader pattern of Syrian government forces’ use of chemical weapons. The attacks are widespread and systematic, and in some cases have been directed against the civilian population. As part of the evidence showing these attacks have become widespread and systematic, the detailed 48-page report identifies the three different systems being used by the Assad regime to deliver chemical weapons.