• China’s Determined Effort to Build an S&T Infrastructure

    For half a century, China, with dogged determination, has pursued its effort to build an S&T infrastructure. A new report from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) notes that foreign technology acquisition continues to play a large role in this effort, with commercial technology products becoming increasingly attractive targets. Beijing’s “hybrid innovation system” blends forms of academic collaboration, industry partnerships, cyber espionage, direct investment, and influence operations to enhance China’s comprehensive national power.

  • Evil Eye Gazes Beyond China’s Borders: Troubling Trends in Chinese Cyber Campaigns

    On March 24, 2021, Facebook announced they had taken actions against an advanced persistent threat (APT) group located in China, previously monikered as Evil Eye. Evil Eye’s campaign was clearly motivated by a political goal that China frequently uses a blend of information operations (IO) and cyber means to accomplish: the disruption of dissidents, especially those who raise awareness of China’s human rights violations against its ethnic minorities.

  • Informant Motivation

    The effective recruitment and deployment of informants is critical to law enforcement and intelligence agencies being able to identify and manage threats. Accurately identifying a source’s motivation for providing information enables an informant handler to better influence the informant’s behavior. A new framework has been devised to help informant handlers better identify motivations.

  • Cyberspace Is Neither Just an Intelligence Contest, nor a Domain of Military Conflict; SolarWinds Shows Us Why It’s Both

    Operations in cyberspace—at least those perpetrated by nation-state actors and their proxies—reflect the geopolitical calculations of the actors who carry them out. Erica D. Borghard writes that cyberspace is sometimes an intelligence contest, and other times a domain of conflict, depending on the strategic approaches and priorities of particular actors at a given moment in time. The SolarWinds campaign shows that “Future conversation needs to move beyond the military versus intelligence contest binary construct to more meaningfully explore how states may seek to use cyberspace for multiple objectives, either in sequence or in parallel,” she writes.

  • Huawei’s Ability to Eavesdrop on Dutch Mobile Users Is a Wake-up Call for the Telecoms Industry

    Chinese technology provider Huawei was recently accused of being able to monitor all calls made using Dutch mobile operator KPN. While the full report on the issue has not been made public, journalists reporting on the story have outlined specific concerns that Huawei personnel in the Netherlands and China had access to security-essential parts of KPN’s network – including the call data of millions of Dutch citizens – and that a lack of records meant KPN couldn’t establish how often this happened.

  • Stoner’s Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of Russia’s New Strength

    Understanding Russia’s power and the Russian leadership’s goals is a necessary task in formulating effective policy. Moreover, as Russia has become considerably more powerful over the last two decades, the stakes in accurately discerning the Kremlin’s motives have become commensurately higher.If Russia Resurrected approached these challenges with more care, discipline and nuance, it could have been an important work.

  • Russia's Secret Services Betray Their Weakness

    Spying, attacks, murder: Moscow’s secret services have shown they are capable of striking even in the heart of the West. Intelligence experts, however, say they are marked by failure and limited means.

  • New AI tool Tracks Evolution of COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories on Social Media

    A new machine-learning program accurately identifies COVID-19-related conspiracy theories on social media and models how they evolved over time—a tool that could someday help public health officials combat misinformation online.

  • Superspreaders of Malign and Subversive Information on COVID-19

    The global spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) created a fertile ground for attempts to influence and destabilize different populations and countries. Both Russia and China have employed information manipulation during the COVID-19 pandemic to tarnish the reputation of the United States by emphasizing challenges with its pandemic response and characterizing U.S. systems as inadequate, and both countries falsely accused the United States of developing and intentionally spreading the virus.

  • China's Disappeared Uyghurs: What Satellite Images Reveal

    One million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, maybe more, have vanished into a sprawling network of camps and prisons in China’s far west. Chinese officials at first denied the camps even existed. Then they claimed they were for training workers, or for re-educating potential radicals. Then they said it didn’t matter—everyone had graduated and was free to go. Satellite data reviewed by RAND tell a different story.

  • The SolarWinds Hack Was All but Inevitable – Why National Cyber Defense Is a “Wicked” Problem and What Can Be Done about It

    Software supply chains are vulnerable to hackers: Many U.S. companies outsource software development because of a talent shortage, and some of that outsourcing goes to companies in Eastern Europe that are vulnerable to Russian operatives. One problem is that U.S. national cyber defense is split between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, which leaves gaps in authority. There are no easy solutions to shoring up U.S. national cyber defenses.

  • Punitive Response to SolarWinds Would Be Misplaced, But Cyber Deterrence Still Matters

    Some analysts argue that the United States should respond to the SolarWinds breach by focusing on improving defenses, rather than on conducting a retaliatory response such as some government officials have been advocating. Apunitive response to SolarWinds may be unwise because the available evidence indicates that the objective of the operation was national security espionage. However, this does not mean that the pursuit of deterrence strategies to address other types of malicious behavior in cyberspace, beyond espionage, is a fool’s errand. Deterrence is not a one-size-fits-all concept in cyberspace—or in any other domain.

  • In the Wake of SolarWinds: Making and Breaking a Rules-Based Global Cyber Order

    We should recognize that the need to make careful distinctions between different categories of cyber operations, and shun the use of emotive and misleading language about “attacks,” should also be extended to the field of political influence via the internet. Using cyberspace to spread propaganda, influence political outcomes and reveal or invent damaging information is an extension of tactics that have been used in different ways for millennia—including by the U.S. Actually trying to rig U.S. elections by tampering with the count online would be completely different and vastly more serious.

  • Coup Plots, Poison, Hacking, Sabotage: What Is the GRU’s Unit 29155?

    In 2012, the salaries of service members of three Russian intelligence units within the GRU were increased significantly. One of these units, Unit 29155, has grabbed outsized attention, having been linked by 2018 to an alleged coup plot in Montenegro and the near-fatal poisonings of a former Russian military intelligence officer in England and an arms dealer in Bulgaria. Now, Czech government allegations that the unit’s members were behind a 2014 explosion at a Czech ammunition depot. “These are the guys you send in because you want to break stuff,” said an expert on Russian security services.

  • The Sino-American Race for Technology Leadership

    The reaction in Washington – one of alarm and outrage — to reports that China trawls America’s open innovation ecosystem stealing prized technologies got that much right. AI and quantum computing, to name just two of them, could change the balance of global power. In identifying economic competitiveness, innovation, and democratic principles as core pillars of national security, the Trump team was on the right track, but instead of offering a coherent strategic response, the Trump administration opted for export and foreign investment control laws with broad and vague reach. “This approach was counterproductive to American innovation leadership. It also failed to address the reality that acquisition of U.S. technology is not the only challenge from China or even, arguably, the most important,” Ferial Ara Saeed writes.