Chlorine attacks continue in Syria with no prospect of Assad being brought to account

These were rare triumphs for international diplomacy and weapons control, but they depended more on an overlap of strategic interests than a shared sense of moral outrage at chemical weapons per se.

Just say no
Indeed, in May 2014, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have referred Syria to the International Criminal Court — the only route through which a legally binding international investigation can be launched.

That veto came despite the huge volumes of evidence pointing towards the culpability of the Assad regime for a host of war crimes, which has been steadily compiled and released by NGOs, security services and the UN Commission of Inquiry.

Indeed, there have even been attempts to block the UN Security Council from formally receiving evidence. Iran, for example, recently tried to stop the communication of findings from a fact-finding OPCW mission in Syria.

It is also very unlikely that anything approaching explicit attribution will be dealt with in any ongoing or future OPCW investigations into Syria, as long as current political realities prevail. While there is scope for discussing the source of chemical weapons attacks under the chemical weapons treaty, pursuing this too tenaciously risks politicizing the gathering of evidence — and that in turn could damage the whole global weapons control regime.

This delicate balance means that Assad and those responsible for the use of chemicals by his forces will only be held accountable following regime change. That time is bound to come eventually, but when this will happen is anyone’s guess.

In the meantime, those who want to see the Assad regime face justice are still trying to find ways around the veto on the ICC referral, with calls for a special ad hoc tribunal similar to the one constructed for the former Yugoslavia.

Advocates for that approach hope that Russia and the Assad regime could be persuaded to agree to one, since tribunals typically prosecute a wider range of suspects. This is because, they argue, that larger ad hoc tribunals make the prosecution of both government and opposition forces more likely.

No impunity
In March 2015, the UN Commission of Inquiry also started circulating the details of suspects to national level prosecutors. National level prosecution could potentially play a role in dealing with those who flee the country following the fall of the Assad regime (as well as foreign fighters returning to home countries). However, it is unlikely that all states will be given the list of names and equally it is likely that some states will provide refuge for certain suspects.

In the meantime, continued geopolitical wrangling over Syria leaves those documenting the continuation of war crimes there almost completely powerless to stop what is happening. For now, the best we can hope for is that relevant organizations are allowed to continue to gather evidence for future trials —– and that pressure is put on all states to prosecute suspected perpetrators. This is to ensure that those who are committing such atrocities know that they will eventually be held to account.

Brett Edwards is Researcher (International Security, Taboo weapons and Innovation) at University of Bath; Mattia Cacciatori is Ph.D. candidate in Conflict Resolution and Transitional Justice at University of Bath. This story is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution/No derivatives.