Central Mali gripped by a dangerous brew of jihad, revolt, and self-defense

Pointing the finger of local elites
In a shifting and fragmented political context, these conflicts obviously do not work independently of each other. There have been multiple alignments among protagonists – including alliances, break-ups and short-term collaborations.

In 2012, as Tamasheq separatists and then jihadis took partial control of central Mali, fractures re-opened among some elements of Fulani society, and between Fulanis and their neighbors. In the absence of the state and its army, local elites were seen as unable to protect citizens against the Tamasheqs of the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA).

Those previously threatened by the MNLA perceived its ousting by the jihadist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) in summer 2012 as a partial relief. Two recent reports, by the International Crisis Group and the anthropologist Boukary Sangare, detail how the MUJWA capitalized on the turbulent history between Fulanis and Tamasheqs and the immediate security needs of non-Tamasheq populations.

These alliances with the jihadis, oscillating between pragmatism and ideological adherence, were severely punished following the French intervention. In the Hayré (Douentza), according to multiple testimonies, Malian armed forces carried out numerous actions. These included cattle theft, intimidation of local people, arbitrary arrests and sometimes summary executions.

Consistent militancy but fluid allegiances
Further to the south, in the Macina heartland, fear of the army and a sense of abandonment by the state prevail. But militancy is more consistent here, expressed in the form of jihad or ethnic identity-based discourses.

Amadou Kufa operates here. The newly created Alliance for the Safeguarding of the Fulani Identity and the Restoration of Justice claims to do so as well.

Through his sermons, Kufa managed at first to convey his message of a return to a mythical time of prosperous faith, when the Fulani – now victimized, according to him – were masters of the faith. In his recent testimonies he has expressed a wish to submit any infidel to his style of faith. He has also renounced ethnic considerations.

Cohesion within his movement is subject to speculation. Kufa’s recruits seemingly follow heterogeneous logics. An indicator of the variable indoctrination of these fighters (estimated at a few hundred) is the fluidity of their allegiances. Some have been recovered, with government approval, by Fulani cadres such as Hamma Founé Diallo.

The warlike, more than genuinely jihadi, attitude of these youths makes their integration in state-backed military units somewhat feasible. In recent years Mali has specialized in delegating security governance to community-based outfits. Pro-government militias have been more active in the north than the regular army.

But Fulani personalities perceived as legitimate are rare among these youths. And attempts to recycle young Fulanis for combat within non-Fulani entities such as The Platform – a coalition of armed northern pro-government movements composed mainly of Arab and Tamasheq loyalists – are hampered by mutual distrust and persistent tensions on the ground.

As such, most of Macina and the whole Hayré remain exposed to violence emanating from isolated groups of herders in revolt against the state, or groups funded by Kufa’s movement and its godfather, Ansar Dine.

The Alliance for the Safeguarding of the Fulani Identity and the Restoration of Justice embodies an explicitly Fulani militant agenda. It emerged following defections from allied associations of Fulani youth. Among them, Bakaye Cissé and Oumar Aldianna initially led the movement.

It is hard to assess its strength, especially since reports of ongoing internal factionalization. Its main leader, Aldianna, has said his force will fight the Malian army wherever necessary. That has upset Fulani elites who are accustomed to conciliation and fear even greater stigmatization of their communities in Mali.

Meetings from March to July between the government and Fulani cadres have not created a realistic prospect of government security intervention in central Mali. The Niono forum in May, between Bambara and Fulani from Kareri, and visits by the justice minister to Bamako prisons in July were beneficial. But they did not end the tensions.

In this context, Ali Nouhoum Diallo, the National Assembly president from 1992 to 2002 and a native of Hayré pastoral communities, launched a coalition of Fulani cadres in September 2016. Long before then, he was a leading figure in reporting abuses by the state in central Mali. His co-ordination, along with his acerbic tone towards the government, roused fears of national division and agitated Fulani civil society.

Center gripped by fear
Fear is omnipresent in the region and economic development has stalled. Humanitarian relief is badly needed. Despite complaints against the army, several civil society representatives desire the return of the state (or rather a state).

Northern Mali has long been the focal point of political turmoil and of international attention. Today, the center – a buffer zone – is in the grip of an intense political crisis. This has possible transnational ramifications as Fulani communities on the continent are closely connected.

In the uncertain context of multiple co-existing conflicts, the attitude of Malian authorities, starting with the security forces, may still decide the trajectories of mobilizations in central Mali.

More generally, the situation shows how the presence of armed jihadi actors stirs up local political tensions. It also shows that political developments in this area intimately depend on specific social configurations. Douentza, Gao, Timbuktu or Kidal reacted to confrontations with the jihadis in their own way. In some cases they create novel social configurations and governance.

It is essential that those who claim to want to help rid Mali of the jihadi threat recognize the diversity of these configurations and of the social experiences deriving from them in times of crisis.

Yvan Guichaoua is Maître de conférences sur les conflits internationaux, University of Kent. Dougoukolo Alpha Oumar Ba-Konaré is Chargé de cours, Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales.This article is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution / No derivative).