BiothreatsBiolabs accidents, and genetic modification research

Exposures to infectious diseases in Bioafety level-3 (BSL-3) and BSL-4 environments can be scary, but they do happen. Concern has always extended beyond the safety of the laboratory worker, but also that a pathogen of pandemic potential could be released.

Lynn Klotz writes in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that

Human error is the main cause of potential exposures of lab workers to pathogens. Statistical data from two sources show that human error was the cause of, according to my research, 67 percent and 79.3 percent of incidents leading to potential exposures in BSL3 labs. These percentages come from analysis of years of incident data from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) and from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Three of the seven FSAP incident categories involve skill-based errors: 1) needle sticks and other through the skin exposures from sharp objects, 2) dropped containers or spills/splashes of liquids containing pathogens, and 3) bites or scratches from infected animals. Some skill errors, such as spills and needle sticks could be reduced with simple fixes.

Pandora Report notes that review of the human errors and whether they are singular events or process failures offer insight into how possible these events are and how we can go about avoiding them. Klotz’s article focuses on a small portion of pathogen research, but it provides a comprehensive and detailed account for many of us who are not familiar with working in these environments.

Other aspects of lab safety have raised concern as well, as more attention has been directed toward gain-of-function (GoF) research. Dr. March Lipsitch and Dr. Tom Inglesby write in the Washington Post about the implications of this research and the quiet green light given by the government for two projects recently.

Apparently, the government has decided the research should now move ahead. In the past year, the U.S. government quietly greenlighted funding for two groups of researchers, one in the United States and the other in the Netherlands, to conduct transmission-enhancing experiments on the bird flu virus as they were originally proposed before the moratorium. Amazingly, despite the potential public-health consequences of such work, neither the approval nor the deliberations or judgments that supported it were announced publicly. The government confirmed them only when a reporter learned about them through non-official channels.

This lack of transparency is unacceptable. Making decisions to approve potentially dangerous research in secret betrays the government’s responsibility to inform and involve the public when approving endeavors, whether scientific or otherwise, that could put health and lives at risk.

We are two of the hundreds of researchers, medical and public-health professionals, and others who publicly opposed these experiments when they were first announced. In response to these concerns, the government issued a framework in 2017 for special review of ‘enhanced’ pathogens that could become capable of causing a pandemic. Under that framework, reviewers must consider the purported benefits and the potential risks and, before approving the work, determine ‘that the potential risks as compared to the potential benefits to society are justified.’

— Read more in Lynn Klotz, “Human error in high-biocontainment labs: a likely pandemic threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (25 February 2019); Marc Lipsitch and Tom Inglesby, “The U.S. is funding dangerous experiments it doesn’t want you to know about,” Washington Post (27 February 2019)