ArgumentThe Defense Production Act and the Failure to Prepare for Catastrophic Incidents

Published 15 April 2020

When early data from Mexico suggested that a new strain of influenza, H1N1, might have a mortality rate between 1 and 10 percent in April 2009, the U.S. government sprang into action. Washington anticipated that the H1N1 virus might lead to a public health catastrophe as bad or worse than what is happening today with COVID-19. Jared Brown writes that the lessons of 2009 were not learnt – or implemented. “The executive branch’s ad-hoc application of the Defense Production Act’s authorities to this pandemic is Exhibit A of how our government, across multiple Republican and Democratic administrations and throughout the national security enterprise, has failed to develop or adapt the Act’s tools for the threats of the 21st century,” he writes.

When early data from Mexico suggested that a new strain of influenza, H1N1, might have a mortality rate between 1 and 10 percent in April 2009, the U.S. government sprang into action. Washington anticipated that the H1N1 virus might lead to a public health catastrophe as bad or worse than what is happening today with COVID-19. Jared Brown writes in War on the Rocks that at the time, he was a junior analyst in the secretary’s office at the Department of Transportation, and he was tasked to work with interagency colleagues to assess ways the Defense Production Act (the Act’s) authorities could be used to respond to the crisis — much like countless unnamed public servants have probably done since early in this pandemic. Luckily, as we all know now, he writes, H1N1 did not lead to consequences such as we see today, though it still became a pandemic and tragically killed an estimated 12,469 Americans within a year.

“After the chaos of the initial response to H1N1 subsided, I distinctly remember optimistically thinking that H1N1 would be the warning sign the nation needed to better prepare for the next catastrophe,” he writes, adding:

Unfortunately, having worked in subsequent years on policies to prepare for, respond to, and recover from catastrophic disasters in both the executive and legislative branches, and now for non-profits, I can attest that the country’s current dismal situation is utterly unsurprising. The executive branch’s ad-hoc application of the Defense Production Act’s authorities to this pandemic is Exhibit A of how our government, across multiple Republican and Democratic administrations and throughout the national security enterprise, has failed to develop or adapt the Act’s tools for the threats of the 21st century. This failure has occurred despite congressional attempts to improve realistic planning for using it in catastrophes.

The United States should use some of the Defense Production Act’s tools that exist, before the next catastrophic disaster comes around. These tools include the forgotten Title VII authority of voluntary agreements. This allows the government to develop action plans directly with industry to respond to anticipated needs from the private sector during a crisis. Federal agencies should also create National Defense Executive Reserve units, which are volunteer groups of private industry experts that can work directly alongside government in times of crisis to supplement or address shortcomings in government expertise. Frankly, our lack of preparedness for this crisis would make our Cold War-era counterparts retreat to their bunkers.