ARGUMENT: Intelligence failuresAfghanistan, Policy Choices, and Claims of Intelligence Failure

Published 26 August 2021

Was the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan the result of an intelligence failure? David Priess, who served as a CIA analyst in the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, writes that to make this judgment, we need answers to many questions. But even if the written records, such as the PDBs, are declassified, “unless and until Joe Biden opens his mind and soul, we are unlikely to understand if he internalized the core judgments in any intelligence documents or briefings.”

The origins of poor policy decisions go much deeper and much wider than problems with intelligence. Intelligence has always been merely one input in a complicated, multifaceted policy process.

David Priess, who served as a CIA analyst in the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, writes in Lawfare that, still, it is fair to admit a serious problem when intelligence is both a crucial factor in national security decision-making and inaccurate, not objective, untimely, or poorly communicated. In these cases, it is correct to talk about “intelligence failure.”

We do not know the details of the intelligence which had reached President Joe Biden, even as observers have been deploying the phrase with regard to the situation in Afghanistan.

Priess writes that there is a consensus that regardless of the wisdom of the decision to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan, the implementation of the evacuation and subsequent communication about it were chaotic and incompetent.

Was the chaos the result of an intelligence failure? Priess writes that to make this judgment, we need answers to many questions, among them:

What did intelligence community assessments back to the start of the year say about developments in Afghanistan—including the likelihood of Taliban advances, the ability and willingness of Afghan government forces to fight, the Taliban timetable for seizing territory, the credibility of any Taliban assurances to the U.S. about Kabul in particular, and so on?

….

Which of these assessments were presented to which policymakers? Were they communicated clearly? Which ones made it into the PDB [Presidential Daily Brief]? Were they orally highlighted, or pointed out for special attention in the written product? Did briefers consciously or subconsciously undermine the bottom line messages?

….

What policy processes took place surrounding the decision to withdraw U.S. forces by September, to announce that timetable to the world, and to execute the policy in the fashion we have seen? Did evolving intelligence assessments contribute to those ongoing processes

Priess writes that a trail of declassified intelligence assessments on other topics around the world strongly suggests that analysts predicted a Taliban resurgence, perhaps without specific dates for key developments. “It wouldn’t surprise me to learn that intelligence officers honestly felt that point predictions would be inappropriately misleading under such rapidly changing circumstances and instead defaulted to what readers often decry as vague, low-confidence warnings.”

The reality is we lack reliable answers to many—most, in fact—of these questions. Priess writers that even if the written records, such as the PDBs, are declassified, “unless and until Joe Biden opens his mind and soul, we are unlikely to understand if he internalized the core judgments in any intelligence documents or briefings.”