Can U.S. Missile-Defense Systems Handle China’s New Missiles?

U.S. missile early warning starts with a network of infrared satellites that can detect a launch of an ICBM and track it through its flight. At the same time, upgraded early warning radars at Beale Air Force base in California, Fylingdales in the UK and Thule in Greenland, along with the Cobra Dane phased-array radar in Alaska and a range of other sensors, give radar tracks that cue missile interceptors for a mid-course intercept.

The U.S. national missile defense system currently consists of 40 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenburg Air Force Base in California, with 20 more to be deployed by 2023. The system is designed to defeat a limited raid from North Korean ICBMs, not a large-scale Chinese or Russian nuclear attack. However, Beijing is clearly anxious about U.S. defensive measures.

For China, the concern driving a FOBS–HGV capability must be that U.S. missile defense will expand and become more effective over time, particularly if an expanded ground-based interceptor force were to be combined with ship-based SM-3 interceptors.

China’s nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the U.S.’s, though the recent discovery of large fields of missile silos under construction in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia suggests that China is moving away from a ‘minimum deterrent’ posture and might be debating caveats on its no-first-use policy. Greater numbers of both silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs, if combined with a niche FOBS-HGV component that can strike the U.S. from the south, would certainly overwhelm any likely U.S. missile defense architecture. That would strengthen Chinese deterrence against U.S. non-nuclear strikes against China’s nuclear forces, demonstrating that even an expanded U.S. capability to counter any residual Chinese nuclear retaliation wouldn’t prevent a Chinese retaliation from inflicting massive damage. Of course, even a limited nuclear capability such as the one being developed by the North Korea changes decision-making, so the perceived need for Chinese nuclear expansion is less rational.

Despite hyperbolic headlines in the media, suggesting that this was a ‘Sputnik moment’, a Chinese FOBS capability isn’t a fundamental game-changer in nuclear stability. Yet it’s not unimportant or irrelevant either. The U.S. will need to respond to this increased threat.

President Joe Biden and his administration would be very unwise to now adopt a nuclear no-first-use posture, or a ‘sole purpose’ declaration as part of its nuclear posture review to be released in 2022. Such a stance would dramatically weaken extended nuclear deterrence, and if such a step were made against a backdrop of Chinese (and Russian) nuclear build-up and force posture changes, it would send the wrong signal to allies looking for U.S. leadership and resolve, especially after the debacle of the Afghanistan withdrawal.

Nor should the Biden administration cancel the ground-based strategic deterrent program that would replace ageing Minuteman ICBMs. Any rush to scrap ICBMs and turn the U.S. nuclear triad into a dyad would only make it easier for an adversary to deliver a decisive nuclear blow in a crisis, even if it couldn’t deliver a knockout punch due to U.S. Navy ballistic missile submarines.

The U.S. should look at options for expanding its missile early warning and missile tracking coverage to deal with hypersonic glide vehicles and threats such as FOBS. Continued development of infrared surveillance satellites will be important, including the ‘next-generation overhead persistent infrared’ (known as ‘Next Gen OPIR’) constellation that will eventually complement the current space-based infrared system. Ground-based sensors such as the upgraded early warning radar network could also be expanded to cover southern launch trajectories from China and Russia.

The FOBS–HGV test presents a challenge but also an opportunity for AUKUS. The projected orbital path from China to the U.S. passes very close to the west coast of Australia. One step that Canberra could take would be to offer to host a U.S. enhanced early warning radar in Western Australia as a joint facility to allow Australia to play an even greater role in supporting U.S. deterrence. Such a facility could complement the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network and be a key sensor in the Defense Department’s integrated air and missile defense project (AIR 6500 Phase 2). But the challenge would be for Australia to act quickly to establish such a facility, rather than make it a decades-long process that renders such a move irrelevant.

In considering how to proceed with AIR 6500 Phase 2, it’s clear that having a resilient space-based sensor layer is vital to track fast-moving missile threats, especially those heading in Australia’s direction. Another good move that could be done via AUKU.S. would be for Australia to work with the U.S. on Next Gen OPIR capabilities, including through sovereign satellite manufacture and launch to augment and reconstitute lost capability in a crisis. Such steps would be early and highly visible achievements for AUKU.S., reinforcing the relevance of the new agreement, which is currently struggling with the question of how to facilitate Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).