ARGUMENT: CHINA’S NUKESChina’s Nuclear Buildup is About More Than Nukes
U.S.-China nuclear and strategic stability will be tested in the coming year after a series of revelations in 2021 about Beijing’s nuclear program. Jacob Stokes writes that “The U.S.-China nuclear and strategic relationship has entered a new stage.” He adds: “Pursuing nuclear and strategic stability between the United States and China will likely prove harder than ever — but it is perhaps more important than ever, too.”
U.S.-China nuclear and strategic stability will be tested in the coming year after a series of revelations in 2021 about Beijing’s nuclear program. It is expanding the size and sophistication of its arsenal, potentially growing its total stockpile to 1,000 warheads by 2030, or just over a quarter of America’s 3,800 warheads. Jacob Stokes writes in Just Security that China also has tested a weapon system that flies into orbit carrying a hypersonic weapon — missile systems that fly five times the speed of sound and can maneuver to avoid defenses — and dug hundreds of new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition, Beijing is reportedly consolidating its nuclear triad of bombers, submarines, and ICBMs; moving to a launch-on-warning posture; and exploring new “exotic” nuclear systems.
He adds:
These developments raise questions about what is motivating China to pursue such capabilities, how nuclear modernization connects to the larger regional security dynamic, and how Washington should respond. The multitude of technical intricacies in this area — from the features of particular weapons systems to nuclear deterrence logic — are (understandably) often difficult for non-specialists to get their arms around. It is possible to understand the overall picture, though, by examining the issues as four concentric circles that show how nuclear-specific issues intertwine with broader concerns in both Beijing and Washington about advanced conventional capabilities and U.S.-China competition overall.
Stokes explains the four concentric circles:
· The first and innermost circle contains the nuclear weapons themselves, along with missile defenses, including the advancements mentioned earlier.
Another more speculative ambition, but one voiced by the head of U.S. Strategic Command, among others, is that China is trying to “break out” of being a second-tier nuclear power and sprint to parity with the United States and Russia.
· The second circle that illustrates how nuclear-weapons issues intersect with broader concerns includes non-nuclear systems that are capable of strategic effects, a nebulous term that generally means massive destruction that shapes the character of a conflict.
Among these are conventionally armed ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles of various ranges. China has the world’s largest arsenal of such missiles that can be fired from land, a fact that played a big role in the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.
· The third circle shows that the aforementioned military capabilities are arrayed in an East Asian region featuring several major flashpoints.
· The fourth and outermost circle showing the overlap between nuclear concerns and broader issues contains the overall U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are feuding across nearly every dimension of bilateral relations — not just the military sphere but also in economics, diplomacy, technology, and governance.
Stokes concludes:
The U.S.-China nuclear and strategic relationship has entered a new stage. Navigating it successfully to uphold deterrence and sustain regional peace and security will require a comprehensive approach that takes into account all four concentric circles and formulates sober, purposeful responses. Pursuing nuclear and strategic stability between the United States and China will likely prove harder than ever — but it is perhaps more important than ever, too.
