UKRAINE WARLessons from the Battle for Kyiv

By Alex Vershinin

Published 21 April 2022

The Russia operation to take Kyiv rapidly degenerated into an urban battle of attrition favorable to Ukraine, and eventually the Russian government withdrew its troops, conceding defeat in the battle for Kyiv. The fog of war prevents in-depth analysis, but two initial lessons stand out from the first phase of the conflict: First, do not rely on the invaded nation’s popular support; second, know when to quit.

It has been eight weeks since the Russian government launched a multi-pronged offensive into Ukraine. In the north, the Russian army laid siege to Kyiv for almost a month. The operation rapidly degenerated into an urban battle of attrition favorable to Ukraine, and eventually the Russian government withdrew its troops, conceding defeat in the battle for Kyiv, while preparing a second phase of the war in Donbas. While the fog of war prevents in-depth analysis, two initial lessons stand out from the first phase of the conflict. First, do not rely on the invaded nation’s popular support. The Russian government appeared to build its operation around the assumption that Ukrainian elites and the populace would support the overthrow of their government, or at the very least stand aside. They did not expect heavy resistance from the Ukrainian population. Second, know when to quit. The Russian government accepted a tactical defeat and the political costs associated with it in order to preserve their combat power for a decisive battle under more favorable circumstances. Both lessons seem self-explanatory, but, previously, many governments have hoped an invasion would trigger a regime change and then refused to correct course when popular support failed to materialize. 

Combat Operations
Initial military operations in the Kyiv area began on the very first day of the invasion with the Russian airborne assault on the Hostomel airport, that put 200-400 paratroopers 15 kilometers outside the Ukrainian capital on Feb. 24. This was a high-risk operation that can only be justified if Russia expected the Ukrainian government to collapse. In addition, a large scale column of about four regiments (15,000 to 20,000 personnel) arrived from Belarus along the west bank of the Dnieper. On the eastern side of the Dnieper two division-sized formations (20,000 – 24,000 personnel) arrived on the north-east side of Kyiv through the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. The Ukrainian government responded by arming the local population and rushing in [regular?] forces from western Ukraine. At the same time, Russian forces successfully attacked out of Crimea aiming to capture bridges over the Dnieper and to attack Ukrainian troops north of Mariupol in the rear, encircling the city.