The Economic Weapon: The Growing Use of Sanctions as a Tool of War

However, it was only in the globalizing world of the 20th century that sanctions moved to center stage. According to Mulder, during World War I, blockades caused more deaths than other anti-civilian weapons combined, although due to their indirect nature they were ‘difficult to render visible or condemn’.

For centuries, sanctions were used mainly as a tool of war, but after World War I they were also viewed as a tool for peace. At the Paris peace talks in 1919, US President Woodrow Wilson rather optimistically dubbed sanctions ‘something more tremendous than war’ that would ultimately render war unnecessary.

The League of Nations, although generally considered ineffective, provided a mechanism for imposing sanctions to prevent war. Mulder describes several instances in the interwar period when the risk of sanctions dissuaded countries from using force.

Ultimately, however, the threat of sanctions was ineffective against major powers and insufficient to prevent another world war. When Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, three-quarters of the world’s states severed most of their commerce with Italy. However, Italy had prepared to withstand shortages, and the sanctions were ineffective.

Mulder reminds us that the risk of sanctions can encourage nationalist powers to build up their self-reliance. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany implemented a nationwide plan to achieve ‘blockade-resilience’, reducing its reliance on raw materials and minimizing its foreign exchange exposure, while Japan saw territorial expansion as a means towards autarky. There are clear parallels with President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which built up its foreign reserves and firmed up its position as an essential supplier of natural gas prior to attacking Ukraine.

Mulder’s focus on the first half of the last century is well justified. It would nonetheless have been useful to include a chapter on more recent sanctions, including those on the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and Iran.

Ironically, as the use of sanctions has surged, their chances of success have plummeted. In the 20th century, only one instance in three of using sanctions was considered ‘at least partially successful’. More recently the success rate has dropped to 20%.

The threat of sanctions, Mulder notes, is more potent as a deterrent than the imposition of sanctions once war has broken out. Not surprisingly, sanctions are more effective against small states than against large ones. These conclusions don’t bode well for the measures taken against Russia.

Mulder concludes with an important chapter on the role of positive sanctions in keeping the peace. During World War II, the American Lend-Lease program provided financial aid as an incentive to oppose the Axis powers.

Mulder’s timely book contains important lessons for decision-makers, not least those dealing with sanctions related to geopolitical hotspots.

Robert Wihtol is an adjunct faculty member at the Asian Institute of Management.This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).