FOREIGN FIGHTERSForeign Fighters in Ukraine: What Concerns Should Really Be on the Agenda?

By Egle E. Murauskaite

Published 23 August 2022

A solid body of research had already explored the global rise in violent extremism and radicalization after battle-hardened fighters had returned home from the Middle East. Initially, there were concerns about similar cases radiating out from Ukraine, with a shade of right-wing extremism. Yet the current picture of foreign fighters in Ukraine differs both from the Middle East and from the fighting in the country’s east during the “gray-zone” phase of the conflict with Russia that began in 2014.

When the simmering conflict between Russia and Ukraine turned into a full-scale war in February, a flurry of media articles followed, anticipating a large influx of foreign fighters on Ukrainian battlefields and debating their potential dangers. A solid body of research had already explored the global rise in violent extremism and radicalization after battle-hardened fighters had returned home from the Middle East. Initially, there were concerns about similar cases radiating out from Ukraine, with a shade of right-wing extremism.

Yet the current picture of foreign fighters in Ukraine differs both from the Middle East and from the fighting in the country’s east during the “gray-zone” phase of the conflict with Russia that began in 2014. Countries whose nationals have made it to the front lines in Ukraine—with some governments officially or tacitly encouraging such travels—should be giving much more thought to the fighters’ fates in the war’s aftermath. While concerns about their espousal of extreme views seem somewhat unfounded, genuine concerns about reintegration into civilian life persist, including the availability of mental and other health care. If these are not addressed, they could become the factors leading to frustration and radicalization.  

In this article I attempt to unpack some key points concerning foreign fighters in Ukraine, namely:

·  Their number on both sides is much smaller than initially expected. Early in the war, Russian, Ukrainian and Western officials spoke of 10,000-20,000 foreigners aiming to join each side. Today, the best estimates we have place the numbers much lower, at maximum “a few thousand” on the Ukrainian side and even fewer on the Russian.

·  Most of the foreign fighters in Ukraine lack combat experience, which limits their battlefield utility.

·  Combat unit integration has been difficult even for experienced fighters due to factors such as insufficient arms, organizational support and coordination, as well as language barriers.

·  In contrast to earlier stages of the conflict, the vast majority of foreign fighters in Ukraine now seem to be apolitical and the presence of white supremacists and other extremists seems negligible. (Paradoxically, the Russian military—which claims “de-Nazification” as one of its goals in Ukraine—seems to be forging closer ties with such elements, along with convicts, through battlefield engagement.)