ARGUMENT: DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGYReliance on Dual-Use Technology is a Trap
The current approach to promoting the use of emerging technology by the Pentagon is for emerging technology companies to work with the Department of Defense is to build commercial applications first and only then move into defense. But the notion of developing “technologies for the commercial market first and only then slap some green paint on them so that they can begin exploring the U.S. defense market” is untenable, Jake Chapman writes. “A better solution would enable entrepreneurs to focus on solving defense challenges by making the Department of Defense a better customer.”
As currently executed, Jake Chapman writes in War on the Rocks, the U.S. military’s embrace of dual-use technology will not repel the Russians from Ukraine and it will not deter China from invading Taiwan. Instead, it risks ceding America’s technological advantage to its adversaries.
Chapman notes that he has been working at the nexus of national security and technology for many years. Initially, he served as a venture capitalist backing frontier technology companies doing security-relevant work. He then acted as managing director of the Army Venture Capital Corporation, a non-profit organization created by Congress to serve the needs of the Department of Defense. Now he is at a new defense-focused firm.
“In all these roles, I have repeatedly seen portfolio companies encouraged to build their technologies for the commercial market first and only then slap some green paint on them so that they can begin exploring the U.S. defense market,” he writes, adding:
This approach is what I call the dual-use hack. It is the idea that the way emerging technology companies should work with the Department of Defense is to build commercial applications first and only then move into defense. Incorporating dual-use technology certainly has its place in constructing the defense ecosystem. Among other things, it helps to mitigate some of the Department of Defense’s first-order challenges in technology adoption, particularly with regard to commercial off-the-shelf technologies. But an overreliance on the commercial-first dual-use hack has generally failed to live up to the hopes laid out almost 30 years ago in the 1995 Dual Use Strategy: A Defense Strategy for Affordable, Leading Edge Technology. This strategy was supposed to ensure that the Defense Department could keep costs low, speed up innovation cycle times, and ensure that America’s industrial base did not atrophy in an environment of falling defense budgets. It has failed at all three of these goals. Costs have skyrocketed, new platform generations take literal generations to release, and America’s defense industrial base has been dangerously eroded in many different sectors.
As if these shortcomings were not enough, an over-dependence on dual-use technology has created several problems on its own. It cedes a growing technical advantage to America’s peer adversaries, discourages startups with cutting-edge intellectual property from building directly for the military’s needs, and provides the Department of Defense with a convenient excuse to avoid or delay real reforms. In short, the dual-use hack has its place, but should no longer be the centerpiece of our national security innovation efforts.
A better solution would enable entrepreneurs to focus on solving defense challenges by making the Department of Defense a better customer. A first step would be to award larger contracts more quickly. The Department of Defense can also communicate better with the entrepreneurial ecosystem regarding current capabilities and problem sets, even if this means sharing more information than they are used to. This communication will serve to lower development risks and make agile, customer-centric development possible. Finally, the Defense Department should provide an incentive system and a clear process that drives successful development projects directly from research and development into acquisitions and sustainment.
He concludes:
I have dedicated my career to supporting the defense innovation base, and I firmly believe that dual-use technology has a role in meeting the military’s technology needs. Some companies should build for the commercial market first, but the Department of Defense cannot always afford to wait for the dual-use track to play out. Companies should be able to build directly for the Department of Defense rather than treating national security as a side hustle. There is no lack of patriotic U.S. entrepreneurs eager to contribute to the country’s defense. Showing industry that developing technology for the military can be successful will cause both financial and human capital to flow into the national security space.
