Monitoring Social Media Platforms | More “Lab-Made Covid” Controversy | Rising Illegal Border Crossings, and more

Which COVID Studies Pose a Biohazard?  (Ewen Callaway and Max Kozlov, Scientific American)
Controversy surrounding a study that involved modifying SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID, has prompted researchers to call for better guidance from funders

QAnon Is Backing These Sec. of State Candidates in 2024 Master Plan  (Kelly Weill, Daily Beast)
Juan O. Savin runs a coalition of candidates who could control future elections. He promotes a “Fallujah”-like attack on D.C.

Monitoring Social Media Platforms: How Intertemporal Dynamics Affect Radicalization Research  (Dennis Klinkhammer, HSToday)
A longitudinal perspective takes into account changing size and topics of echo chambers over time and considers that radicalization is a process.

DOD, Intelligence Community Unprepared for Biological Threats  (GAO)
Biological threats are one of the most serious national security challenges facing the United States and the international community, as stated in the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy (strategy). In many countries around the world, pathogens are stored in laboratories that lack appropriate biosafety or biosecurity measures, according to the strategy. The lack of appropriate safety and security measures increases the risk of either an outbreak through an accidental pathogen release or diversion of a pathogen by actors such as terrorist organizations—either of which, among other factors, could increase the risk that another public health emergency like COVID-19 occurs.
Going forward, the COVID-19 pandemic and other biological threats may present new risks for which federal agencies that have a role in responding to biological threats, including DOD and the IC, will need to prepare. For example, Chinese companies are gaining access to global health data by establishing laboratories intended to support COVID-19 testing. The analysis of large genetic data sets from diverse populations can help foster new medical discoveries and cures. However, in the hands of the Chinese government, this genetic information could pose national security consequences and risks to the joint force and mission of DOD and the IC. Medical intelligence—the collection, evaluation, and analysis of health threats and issues—is critical for managing these types of risks of global health threats and plays a key role in helping the United States prepare for such threats.
The ongoing effect of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for an increased emphasis on monitoring and warning of threats from infectious diseases and other global health risks. Further, the promise of genetic data comes with national security risks, especially if U.S. genetic data is obtained by the Chinese government or foreign intelligence entities. Moving forward, medical intelligence will continue to be of great importance both to DOD operations and for informing policy makers in the areas of public health and national security.
While NCMI has processes in place to produce and distribute its growing number of medical intelligence products, GAO identified gaps in NCMI’s guidance and processes that limited NCMI’s ability to appropriately share these products with some customers. In addition, DOD is rethinking its strategic approach to biodefense and is taking a number of positive steps. However, GAO identified a number of needed actions, such as developing an integrated and comprehensive DOD-wide biodefense strategy that, for example, identifies where biodefense resources and investments should be targeted. GAO also identified actions needed to better mitigate risks associated with genetic data.
For the United States to be prepared to respond to challenges posed by biological threats in the future, DOD and the IC will need to implement a number of actions GAO has identified that would help DOD and the IC make progress, including those in figure 1. Implementing these actions would better position DOD and the IC to respond to emerging biological threats.