War Over Taiwan? | Why Germany Won’t Go Nuclear | The Cuban Embargo Was a Failure from the Beginning, and more

In recent months, cyberthreat actors affiliated with Russian military intelligence have launched destructive wiper attacks against energy, water and other critical infrastructure organizations’ networks in Ukraine as missile strikes knocked out power and water supplies to civilians across the country. Russian military operators also expanded destructive cyberactivity outside Ukraine to Poland, a critical logistics hub, in a possible attempt to disrupt the movement of weapons and supplies to the front.
Meanwhile, Russian propaganda seeks to amplify the intensity of popular dissent over energy and inflation across Europe by boosting select narratives online through state-affiliated media outlets and social media accounts to undermine elected officials and democratic institutions. To date, these have had only limited public impact, but they foreshadow what may become broadening tactics during the winter ahead.
We believe these recent trends suggest that the world should be prepared for several lines of potential Russian attack in the digital domain over the course of this winter.

Why Germany Won’t Go Nuclear  (Roger George and Robert Levine, National Interest)
Germans contemplating the size of the needed investment, the risks associated with its existence, and the consequences of its use are unlikely to opt for this path.

The Cuban Embargo Was a Failure from the Beginning  (Scott McCann, National Interest)
Despite the Soviet Union’s collapse and Castro’s death, the Cuban embargo continues because of contemporary American political dynamics.

Biden Can’t Denounce Russia’s Annexations and Ignore Israel’s  (Brian Finucane, Foreign Policy)
From the Baltic Republics to Crimea, Washington has opposed forcible annexation—and the Golan Heights should be no exception.

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal is Closing its Doors: Here’s What to Know About its Final Case  (Marija Đorđeska, Just Security)
Much has been said about the political nature of the tribunal and the not-so-hidden agenda of Cambodia’s Prime Minister, Hun Sen to have the proceedings prematurely terminated despite the lengthy investigations (with four cases being dismissed). Politics aside, what will Case 002/02 (and the ECCC) be remembered for?

Fighting and Winning in the Electromagnetic Spectrum  (John Christianson, War on the Rocks)
Starlink has proved critical for combat operations in Ukraine, and the system appears nimble enough to withstand sophisticated Russian electromagnetic attack. The U.S. military once dominated this domain, but due to lack of investment and years of flying close air-support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. skills have atrophied. Starlink’s agility has impressed many senior leaders. This realization, however, is not new. While addressing the Air Force Association’s 2021 Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, Gen. Mark Kelly, commander of Air Combat Command, said: “If we lose the war in the electromagnetic spectrum, we lose the war in the air, and we lose it quickly.”
The electromagnetic spectrum is a critical aspect of American and Western airpower, which has led some to dub it the next high ground. This renewed focus on the spectrum is further reflected in the 2020 Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy and associated service strategies. Despite this, the joint force is not investing in capabilities to ensure dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum. This is particularly acute in the air domain, where the U.S. military has invested less in the spectrum than adversaries committed to disrupting how the United States plans for and fights wars. 
Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have invested resources into challenging American advantages in the electromagnetic spectrum. These investments are designed to detect low-observable fighters and bombers and to disrupt the kill chains that the U.S. military relies upon to plan the opening days and months of military campaigns. In order to compete with these adversaries, the U.S. military should reinvigorate training to provide a realistic view of a contested environment; maintain current offensive electromagnetic warfare capabilities until newer advanced systems can be fielded; and hasten the development of new systems to deny adversaries freedom of maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum.