Accepting Reality: For the Foreseeable Future, Denuclearizing North Korea May Be Unattainable

I was among the first to publicly urge an arms control approach with North Korea in lieu of denuclearization years ago — and have since been joined by other prominent nuclear analysts. But as far as I’m aware, this report is the first attempt to translate what such a shift should mean for U.S. North Korea policy in detail.

The report Jackson refers to is his Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy, issued by the Center for a New American Security.

Here is the Executive Summary of the report:

Executive Summary
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament.

Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim.

But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea.

Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test.

Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.

An Arms Control Blueprint
Unilateral Actions

·  Curb Denuclearization Rhetoric—The White House should state that denuclearization will no longer be a concrete goal of U.S. North Korea policy.

·  Announce Stable Coexistence—In tandem with a pivot away from denuclearization, the United States should declare that it is willing to peacefully coexist with North Korea under the Kim regime as long as it does not actively threaten South Korea or Japan.

·  Institutionalize a Strategic Security Dialogue with North Korea—To manage the risks of inadvertent conflict and tailor its own deterrence posture more effectively, the United States needs to understand as accurately as possible how North Korea thinks about coercion, nuclear doctrine, and conditions of nuclear use.

·  Issue a “No Nuclear Deployment” Executive Order—The White House should issue an executive order (EO) suspending deployments of nuclear-capable bombers to the Korean Peninsula, including the B-1B, which is no longer nuclear-capable but poses a discrimination problem for North Korea by introducing the same risks as if it were. The EO should have a provision requiring the president to approve any redeployment decision.

·  Declare an End to the Korean War—Declare an intention to end the Korean War as a political matter. If the United States sees value in maintaining a long-term presence on the Peninsula, it would be on firmer footing if its presence is based not on a war fought more than two generations ago, but rather predicated on whatever the logical merits are for keeping troops in Korea now and in the future.

Phase I Negotiation Initiatives

·  Freeze Nuclear Progress without Intruding into “Kim’s Bathroom”—The State Department should negotiate a moratorium on all North Korean nuclear activities and allow international monitors to establish an initially limited presence in North Korea. The United States should triangulate verification—relying heavily on intelligence collection and passive open-source analysis—rather than hold negotiations hostage to an unrealistically intrusive inspections regime at the outset.

·  Preemptively Ban “Tactical” Nukes—U.S. negotiators not only should seek a North Korean commitment to cap its existing arsenal at present numbers, but also to gain a North Korean agreement not to diversify its nuclear capabilities into operational low-yield nuclear weapons.

·  De-Operationalize North Korean Missile Forces—The State Department should seek a North Korean commitment for the Missile Guidance Bureau to de-operationalize its missile forces. This could be done, for example, by mutually agreeing to keep military alert levels low, restricting the use of solid fuel propellant, and/or allowing inspectors of missile facilities to monitor their non-operational status.

Phase II Negotiation Initiatives

·  Launch a Nuclear-Free Seas Initiative—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department should jointly negotiate a mutual ban on nuclear weapons within the exclusive economic zones (200 nautical miles) on either side of North Korea’s coasts.

·  Start Nuclear Rollback—Once the arms control process has matured to the point that rollback becomes feasible, U.S. negotiators should prioritize reducing parts production for, and inventory of, the Pukkuksong series of solid-fuel missiles, followed by Musudan, Nodong, and SCUD missiles.

·  Secure Declarations of Nuclear Inventory—Once the United States and North Korea have established a degree of confidence and predictability by implementing Phase 1 Negotiation Initiatives, the State Department should seek a declaration focusing on fissile-material production facilities—revealing this information does not pose any risk to North Korea’s nuclear deterrent. If North Korea complies without any deception, the Strategic Security Dialogue proposed above should be used to elicit insights about the disposition, quantity, and posture of North Korean nuclear weapons.

In parallel with this arms control process, additional measures will help mitigate the risk that North Korea reneges on commitments or fails to reciprocate U.S. attempts to transform U.S.–Korean Peninsula security dynamics.

Risk Mitigation Measures

·  Establish Rapid-Reaction Deterrence in South Korea—If negotiation and efforts to transform the U.S.–North Korea relationship fail, the nuclear threat can only be managed through deterrence. U.S. force posture in South Korea therefore should adapt to the requirements of deterrence against a second-tier nuclear-armed adversary with a track record of small-scale violence.

·  Repurpose Extended Deterrence Dialogues with Allies—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department should repurpose existing extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea as mechanisms for shoring up the credibility of U.S. commitments.

·  Preserve Sanctions that Combat Proliferation—As the United States undertakes various forms of sanctions relief—a necessary concession in any nuclear bargaining process—it should avoid removing those deemed necessary as legal architecture for combating North Korean trafficking in nuclear and missile materials.