Protecting U.S. Overseas Air Bases

Toward that end, RAND has analyzed the cost-effectiveness of numerous alternatives for ACE and for air base resilience more broadly in dozens of reports over the past several years. Early on, RAND defined resilience as “the capacity of a force to withstand attack, adapt, and generate sufficient combat power to achieve campaign objectives in the face of continued, adaptive enemy action” (Hagen et al., 2016, p. 3). Achieving such resilience requires close familiarity with the threat, a systematic approach for addressing it, and sustained efforts to build on investments in air base protection.

Chinese and Russian Weapons Challenge U.S. Defenses
China’s threat to U.S. Air Force bases in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in a Chinese strategy that emphasizes surprise and preemption and in a Chinese missile force that contains the most formidable arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles in the world, plus ground- and air-launched long-range cruise missiles. China’s missile force includes ground-launched DF-21 medium range ballistic missiles, ground-launched DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missiles, and bomber-launched CJ-20 long-range cruise missiles. Early in a conflict, China could strike U.S. and partner-nation air bases, air and missile defense systems, and command centers with large ballistic and cruise missile raids. The missiles and their submunitions could be optimized for attacking runways or destroying aircraft on parking ramps. Numerous studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. and partner airfields to such attacks and the rapidly growing threat to those airfields.

U.S. Air Force bases in Europe face a threat from Russian missiles. In any conflict with the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies (for example, the Baltic states), Russian doctrine would call for using manned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and possibly even nuclear weapons to attack NATO air bases. Although the Russian missile force is smaller and less advanced than its Chinese counterpart, the Russian force still represents a threat to NATO air operations. Russian attacks on Ukrainian air bases show Russia’s willingness to target airfields. Also, while Russia has expended a considerable portion of its missile inventory in the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s potential long-range attack capability— including KH-101 cruise missiles, RS-26 ballistic missiles, and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles—could threaten NATO bases throughout the region in the event of a larger conflict.

NATO air bases do, however, have advantages that somewhat mitigate the threat in Europe. In contrast to the western Pacific, there are many high-quality airfields available throughout western Europe, all of which are accessible by road and rail. In addition, NATO fighter bases generally have hardened shelters for fighter aircraft, and many of those bases have other hardened facilities. The primary problem for NATO is that larger U.S. and allied aircraft—such as tankers; bombers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms—would need to operate from more remote bases to avoid the worst of the Russian threats.

In the Indo-Pacific and European theaters and beyond, the traditional measures for shielding air bases from cruise and ballistic missile attacks are U.S. Army air and missile defense systems, specifically the Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The two systems have complementary roles: The PATRIOT system is designed to shoot down aircraft, cruise missiles, and short- to medium-range ballistic missiles; the THAAD system is designed to shoot down longer-range tactical ballistic missiles. However, the increasingly capable adversary missiles— some of which are ballistic missiles armed with hypersonic glide vehicles—now challenge the legacy U.S. defenses.

Hagen, Jeff, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, and Matthew Carroll, The Foundations of Operational Resilience—Assessing the Ability to Operate in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Environment: The Analytical Framework, Lexicon, and Characteristics of the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM), Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1265-AF, 2016. As of August 17, 2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1265.html

Pope, Charles, “Kendall Outlines ‘Operational Imperatives,’ Choices During Think Tank Appearance,” Office of Public Affairs, Secretary of Air Force, January 19, 2022. As of February 14, 2022:  https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2904711/kendall-outlines-operational-imperatives-choices-during-think-tank-appearance